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Abstract

In January 2011, Egypt witnessed an uprising against ex-military president Hosni
Mubarak, which resulted in his removal after ruling Egypt for thirty years. Yet, while the
revolution targeted Mubarak, it also targeted to end the era of military rule, which started
in 1952 with President Gamal Abdel Nasser, then was passed down to Anwar Sadat in
1970 and later to Hosni Mubarak in 1981. Thereafter, dissatisfied with existing national
policies, political leaders and revolutionaries battled to redefine Egyptian national
identity by contesting the writing of a new Egyptian constitution. The debates over the
constitution exhibited an ample of destructive communication patterns that triggered my
research question and hypotheses. In this thesis, I pose the question as to how a critical
analysis of the communication patterns of the conflict actors involved elucidates Egypt’s
current state of affairs. The outcomes showed that the calm after an approved constitution
in January 2014, and the return of the military to power in June 2014, maybe the silence
before another revolutionary storm, because many underlining issues remain unresolved.
In this thesis, I argue that the equivocal nature of Egyptian national identity and the
exclusivist nature of the nationalistic approaches utilized to determine it were core
elements that added to the conflict’s lengthiness and exacerbation. Moreover, I show that
the lack of understanding of these aggravating elements among the parties involved is
due to the absence of positive dialogue that may aid in their deconstruction. To conclude,
I explain through Egypt’s bygone narrative how psychological layers, that begin with
postcolonial-trauma and end with sheer distrust, are what hinder positive dialogical
approaches amid the parties concerned.

COMPETING	
  NARRATIVES	
  	
  

ii
Dedication

To my parents, for their unconditional embracement through all of my accomplishments

COMPETING	
  NARRATIVES	
  	
  

iii
Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions,
their enthusiasm, and their cooperation in supporting this thesis: Harry Anastasiou, chair
of this thesis and director of the Conflict Resolution Program at Portland State University,
for his in-depth support with the overarching vision and the theoretical, analytical, and
recommendation sections in this thesis; Rachel Cunliffe, a committee member for this
thesis and faculty member at Portland State University, for her remarkable assistance
with the methodology section in this thesis; and Robert Gould, a committee member for
this thesis and faculty member at Portland State University, for allowing me to explore
the philosophical and psychological aspects presented in this thesis. In addition, I would
like to acknowledge Professor Amanda Byron for further help with the methodology
section, Arabic professor Lina Gomaa for help with the Arabic-English translations
needed for this thesis, and editor Jennifer Zaczek for copyediting this thesis.
Finally, I am genuinely grateful to both of my boys, Yusuf and Noah, for their
young hearted inspiration of innocence and peace, and to my mentors and colleagues,
particularly Carol Gabrielli, who have graciously offered time to inquire and reflect on
the initial proposal for this thesis; their contributions were a major component in my
ability to produce a comprehensive analysis.

COMPETING	
  NARRATIVES	
  	
  

iv
Table of Contents

Abstract ....................................................................................................................... i
Dedication .................................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgments...................................................................................................... ii
Glossary ......................................................................................................................v
Chapter 1
Introduction .................................................................................................................1
Chapter 2
Literature Review......................................................................................................07
Chapter 3
Methodology .............................................................................................................28
Chapter 4
Analysis and Discussion ...........................................................................................34
Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommendations .........................................................................90
References ...............................................................................................................100

COMPETING	
  NARRATIVES	
  	
  

v
Glossary

Alashwaeyat: Buildings built by the members of Egypt’s poorest communities without
any engineering or architectural guidance, thus they face overcrowding and other social
and public health issues due to their poor engineering structures.
Article II of the Egyptian constitution (1971-2013): States that Islam is the religion of
the State and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic Sharia are the main
source of legislation.
Caliphate: A state under the leadership of an Islamic steward known as the caliph, a
person considered a religious successor of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and a leader
of the entire Muslim community. Historically, the caliphates were polities based in Islam,
which developed into multiethnic transnational empires. During the medieval period,
three major caliphates existed: the Rashidun Caliphate (632–661), the Umayyad
Caliphate (661–750), and the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258). The fourth major caliphate,
the Ottoman Caliphate, was a manifestation whereby the Ottoman rulers claimed caliphal
authority.
Cornish: A platform or boardwalk along a river (Nile) or seashore (Alexandria coast).
Fatwa: In the Islamic faith, a nonbinding but authoritative legal opinion or learned
interpretation that a qualified jurist or mufti can give on issues pertaining to Islamic law.
Fava beans or ful medames: A dish of cooked fava beans served with vegetable oil,
cumin, and optionally with chopped parsley, garlic, onion, lemon juice, chili pepper, and
other vegetables, herbs, and spices; notably a food staple in Egypt.
Flare point: A term used to describe certain communicational exchanges that were
heated and intense in nature and may or may not have led to violence.
House of Representatives: The lower house of the Egyptian parliament; the unicameral
parliament of Egypt.
Imam: An Islamic leadership position most commonly used as the title of a worship
leader of a mosque and Muslim community among Sunni Muslims. In this context,
imams may lead Islamic worship services, serve as community leaders, and provide
religious guidance.
Master-narrative: A narrative that combines two or more sub-narratives with similar or
varying national ideologies but agree on the conflict topic (The constitution).
Mufti: The person who issues a fatwa. In Egypt, the word is mostly used to refer to the
Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Mosque, as he is the main figure in issuing the final fatwa on
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controversial religious matters. This is not necessarily a formal position, since most
Muslims argue that anyone trained in Islamic law may give an opinion on its teachings.
Narrative: The story told by individuals through certain metaphors, symbols, etc.
embodying certain ideologies to normalize their perception of the soul of Egypt.
Normalization: The discursive process by which conflict actors present their identity
narrative, which aims to portray that the majority is aware and agrees with the presented
information.
Salaf: Relating to the first three generations of Muslims (i.e., the generations of the
Islamic prophet Muhammad and his companions, their successors, and the successors of
those successors).
Shura Council: The upper house of the formerly bicameral parliament of Egypt.
Sharia, Sharia law, or Islamic law: The religious law derived from the religious
precepts of Islam, the holy book (the Qur’an) and the narrations of the prophet
Muhammad, the Hadith. Sharia refers to God’s immutable divine law and is contrasted
with fiqh, which is its human scholarly interpretations. The manner of its application in
modern times has been a subject of dispute between Muslim traditionalists and reformists.
Soul of Egypt: A term used in this thesis to reference the national identity of Egypt
because it denotes that national identity is a given—an “ordained” identity by God,
history, or common sense.
Sub-narrative: A narrative that describes individuals promoting a similar national
ideology.
Tarboosh: A short, cylindrical, peakless headdress or hat made of kilim fabric, usually
red, and sometimes with a tassel attached to the top. The tarboosh owes much of its
development and popularity to the Ottoman era, and is worn especially by Muslim men
throughout the Eastern Mediterranean region.

COMPETING	
  NARRATIVES	
  	
  

1
Chapter 1
Introduction

This thesis is an investigation of the events unfolding in Egypt between 2011 and
2014. These events commence with a people driven revolt against ex-military president
Hosni Mubarak in particular, and against military rule in general. My interest in writing a
thesis about this Egyptian revolution arose when I learned that in June of 2014 the
military had returned to the ruling chair under the leadership of another military general,
General Abdel-Fatah Al-Sisi. I instigated my research by reviewing accounts of the
events between 2011 and 2014 and instantly noted that a center stage point of contention
was the conflicting views on the definition of Egyptian national identity. Yet, what
deepened my interest in the study were the destructive communicative patterns utilized
by the participants, which often transformed dialogue into debates and debates into
violent conflicts. This particular observation triggered me to pose the following research
question: How does communication between the narratives shaping the events unfolding
in Egypt since the 2011 revolution elucidate the current state of affairs?
In this thesis, I argue that the equivocal nature of Egyptian national identity and
the exclusivist nature of the nationalistic approaches as communicative means are major
components in making the conflict a continuous struggle. Moreover, I reveal that the lack
of understanding for these aggravating elements among the parties involved is due to the
absence of positive dialogue that may aid in their deconstruction. Furthermore, I explain
how psychological layers that begin with postcolonial-trauma and end with sheer distrust
are what hinder positive dialogical ventures. I provide a perspective that competes against
the local and international community’s concerns with Egypt’s future by providing an
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account of the bygone history that has led to Egypt’s current national identity
predicament.
Thus, before delving into the details of the analysis and the arguments I will put
forth, certain elements of Egyptian history are essential to underscore. Egyptian history is
notably recorded with the Pharaonic period, were dynasties of the pharaohs (A
civilization hypothesized by modern mainstream Egyptians as the origin of Egyptian
identity) ruled for almost 3000 years until the Achaemenid Persians conquered Egypt and
claimed the title of Pharaoh. When Alexander the Great toppled the Persians, Egypt
became the center of a Greek culture that tried to gain the respect of its natives by
claiming to be heirs to the Pharaohs. Though Greeks took on Pharaonic traditions and
portrayed themselves on public tombstones, they faced revolts from the natives that
weakened their position, and ultimately caused them to surrender Egypt to Rome
(Hoffman, 1979; Midant-Reynes, 2000; Rawlinson & Komroff, 1928; Bowman, 1989).
Rome presented Egypt with Christianity, an Egyptian translation of the New
Testament, and the establishment of the Egyptian Coptic Church of Alexandria. With the
Church recognized as second in honor to the Church of Rome, Christianity spread to
constitute the majority of Egypt’s population. However, the Muslim Arab invasion
brought Sunni Islam with a Cairo-based Islamic caliphate that remained in control for six
centuries. After 600 years of Islamic ruling, Egypt continued to carry its Islamic identity
through a Turkish Ottoman Empire lens. During those years, the indigenous population
experienced a French invasion in 1798 led by Napoleon, which was dislodged by
Ottoman Albanian commander Muhammad Ali, who eventually betrayed the Ottomans
and seized Egypt for himself (“The Napoleonic Invasion of Egypt,” n.d.; Bowman, 1989).
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During the final years of Muhammad Ali’s successors, Britain colonized Egypt,
further exposing its people to additional modern Western identities. With Britain’s
presence, Ali’s heirs remained symbolically in power while the British took control of
Egypt’s political affairs (Bowman, 1989). In 1919, backlashing at the British for exiling
an Egyptian liberal revolutionary, Egyptians held mass demonstration demanding a
parting from colonial and Ottoman occupation (Bisgaard-Church, 2011). The revolts
concluded with Egypt’s partial separation from the British and the first 19th century
Egyptian constitution, both giving Egyptians some ruling power. In 1952, due to growing
discontent with the static power imbalances amid British, Ottomans, and Egyptian leaders,
a famed military-driven coup called for the independent republic of Egypt (Cook, 2011).
The achievement of full independence was dubbed in mainstream modern-day Egyptian
perspective as Egypt’s return to its rightful heirs (The pharaohs). This modern day view
sketched a continuous lineage between the pharaohs and contemporary Egyptians as
legatees of Egypt. Moreover, it termed the intermediate ruling period, between Pharaoh
Egypt and The Republic of Egypt, as a period of unwelcomed foreign rule, while granting
the military the mantle of protecting hero.
Yet much to the people’s disbelief, in the years that followed, Egypt witnessed a
long drawn-out toggling of power amid its authoritarian and highly privileged military
representatives. Additionally, the country experienced deteriorating economic, healthcare,
and educational systems, due to multi-level corruption and an incompetent workforce
fueled by the military’s will to dominate. This prompted a desperate need for change,
which was already neighboring in motion with a Tunisian revolution against its own
dictating regime. Thus, inspired by the Tunisian movement, Egyptians held mass
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demonstration in January 2011 against military President Hosni Mubarak demanding his
removal, a change to the constitution, along with changes to several other governing laws.
This historical context provides an opportunity to explain why the period between
2011 and 2014 warrants exploration. In doing so, I will revert to the title of this thesis,
which is Competing Narratives: The Struggle for the Soul of Egypt. Here, I want to
emphasize that what I mean by “soul” is reference to an imagined unquestionable
Egyptian national identity; it is a national identity that is unceasing historically and
supposed to be universally accepted by all Egyptians. Next, I want to emphasize that
what I mean by narratives are the collection of certain ideas, metaphors, stories, and
symbols communicated by specific individuals to steer public opinion towards a
particular definition of Egypt’s soul; Egypt’s alleged undisputed and continuous national
identity.
Hence, what makes the years between 2011 and 2014 a unique period in Egyptian
history was that it gave rise to an opportunity to launch a national debate around the
future Egyptian national identity, particularly, a debate undisrupted by the influences of
foreign rule and military power. As such, the void within the political arena, which was
once filled by conquerors and afterwards by the military, triggered many narratives to
redefine a presumed diachronic Egyptian national identity that likewise drafts Egypt’s
political future. However, because there were multiple supposed versions of a diachronic
Egyptian national identity, the political arena became a battle zone of intense arguments
and violent outbreaks for debating which version is accurate through multiple governing
vehicles, such as the outbreaks surrounding redrafting the Egyptian constitution.
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From my initial reviewing of the conflict, I embarked on my study knowing that
the debates surrounding redrafting the constitution related to the debated determination of
the true Egyptian National identity. I also sensed by witnessing the historical references
within the communicative dynamic that the conflict would be difficult to understand
without historical contextualization. On the other hand, I was unsure which identity
version was accurate, and whether I would conclude by determining a true single
Egyptian national identity. Nonetheless, from a conflict resolution perspective, arbitration
was not a goal; deciding which identity version is worthy, rather a bonus if my analysis
unearthed so. I was more concerned with questions surrounding the above destructive
communicative dynamic.
My hypotheses to analyze this communicative dynamic rested on the idea that it
would uncover the narrators’ motive to influence the identity definition in a particular
direction. In addition, I hypothesized that the analysis may reveal why the identity
narratives varied to begin with, which may inevitably lead to which identity narrative is
accurate. Another hypothesis suggested that an analysis of the communicative patterns
could unearth why the contenders were unsuccessful at dialoging. Thus, since I was
interested in investigating how these societal power relations are established and
reinforced through language and history, I decided to use a form of Critical Discourse
Analysis (CDA) called the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) as my methodology in
collecting and analyzing the communications between the involved narratives.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I offer a relevant literature review developed in
accordance with the emerging themes from the communication excerpts I collected for
the period between 2011 and 2014, and before 2011 for historical contextualization. In
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the subsequent chapters, Chapter 3 explains the methodology for collecting and analyzing
these communications, Chapter 4 provides examples of the comprehensive analysis and a
discussion of these conversational exchanges, and Chapter 5 provides recommendations
to the issues highlighted in the analysis that may place the Egyptian community on a path
to peaceful resolution.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

As described in the introduction, the focus of this study is on the analysis of
communicational exchanges amid the groups involved in the Egyptian conflict between
the period of 2011 and 2014. The present chapter focuses on a literature review produced
in accordance with the emerging themes from the communicational exchanges selected
for analysis. The overarching theme as described briefly in the introduction centers on the
conflict groups’ attempts to redefine Egyptian national identity. As such, an in-depth
exploration of group identity theory and closely related literature was necessary, such as
literature relating to how identities behave under conditions of conflict, and how they
behave during colonial and post-colonial periods, given Egypt’s history.
Moreover, I specifically looked at the impact of colonialism on political structures
in post-colonial nation-states. Amongst those impacts, I reviewed literature on rising
nationalism as reaction to colonialism in post-colonial nations, especially in the case of
Egypt. I studied specific cases of emerging Egyptian nationalisms during and post-British
colonization. I also studied the psychological impact of colonialism and learned how
colonialism was a passageway for racial arrogance that inevitably produced feelings of
inferiority within the Egyptian community. Correspondingly, I regarded literature about
the several forms these feelings of inferiority express themselves in post-colonial nations.
Not surprisingly, I found evidence connecting these feelings to arrogant behavior,
combativeness, and exclusiveness, all of which are sustained by the narcissistic nature of
nationalism.
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Moreover, I reviewed the impact of utilizing arrogant and nationalistic approaches

on conflict, and their relation to violence and distrust. This assessment focused on
understanding the process of polarization through the breakdown of communication and
the creation of in-groups and out-groups. This review led me into further literature
regarding the benefits of contact between divided communities, also known as contact
theory. Finally, I studied the efficacies of positive dialogue and argumentative dialogue,
and the importance of incorporating core elements in the process of designing dialogue
for divided communities. In the next section, I go into each area of the literature in more
detail, and briefly explain their applicability to Egypt’s conflict.
Social Identity Theory
Beginning with a general understanding of the need for identity, many human
need theorists assert that identity is a basic human need, it is a psychological sense of self
that further extends to a sentiment of belonging (Rothman, 1997). People generally are
comprised of multiple identities, racial, national, gender, and more. Kriesberg (2003)
explains that while some of the characteristics that make up individual and group
identities are assigned at birth, such as skin color, many are cultured as a result of
ongoing varying lived experiences, such as language, beliefs, and nationality (Burton,
1990; Kriesberg; Rothman). Kriesberg therefore arrives at the conclusion that identity is
rather fluid in nature and constantly changing, and adds:
Many identities…are not based on ascribed traits but on shared values, beliefs, or
concerns, which are varyingly open to acquisition by choice.…This is also true
for political ideologies, attachment to particular pieces of land, or practicing a
particular way of life.…They can endure for generations or change with shifting
situations. (paras. 10)
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Because of this fluidity, overtime, many aspects that make up individual identity
end up assimilated by choice. Moreover, many of those traits extend to a membership in a
larger group and by the same token an exclusion from another, a dynamic that otherwise
can be viewed as in-group and out-group identity formation. For Egypt’s conflict, it is
crucial to understand the process by which these memberships materialize. Tajfel and
Turner (1986) explain this process, an individual’s affiliation with in-groups and outgroups, through three stages. The first is “social categorization,” placing the “self,”
within a certain group; the second is “social identification,” viewing the traits of members
within that group as attuned to one’s own; and the third is “social comparison,” becoming
impacted by the world’s perceptions of the in-group and the out-group. Tajfel and Turner
say that social comparison is pivotal to a positive uniqueness attributed to in-group
members to safeguard social identity. Oppositely, mourning for in-group trials hinders
group social identity. Kriesberg (2003) confirms the latter saying, “People feel injured
when other persons sharing their identity are injured or killed. Sometimes people are even
willing to sacrifice their individual lives to preserve their identity group” (p. 1).
These principles are extremely relevant to the historical contextualization of the
events in Egypt between 2011 and 2014, and a core element of the conflict that is
expanded on in the discussion section of this thesis. For example, in the years leading to
the 1952 coup, a social urge to reform a national political identity was in order due to
British and Ottoman presence. Yet, because of Egypt’s historical cultural intermixing, at
that time Egyptians comprised a melting pot of ideologies. Thus, various identity groups
where formed through varying processes of social categorization, social identification,
and social comparison. The categorization process was a result of Egyptians’ varied lived
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experiences and interactions, and consequently, Egypt became a pool of ideologically
conflicting identity groups. In the analysis section I present these identity groups and
their role in the conflict. Then, I underline how injuries to a member of one group were
magnified as injuries to the entire group, and used as a mechanism of disqualifying the
perpetrating group from national inclusion. I also provide examples of such dynamic and
its impact on communication between the groups. Moreover, I review how group
supremacy was salient amongst all these groups, and used as a mechanism in the
determination of Egyptian national identity. In the discussion section, I go into a more
detailed historical description of the reality of how each of these identity groups was
formed in order to explain the equivocality of Egyptian identity.
These principles license social identity theory as a far-reaching model in
intergroup conflicts, especially in post-colonial related conflicts such as in the case of
Egypt. Below, I review further literature regarding the formation process and behaviors
of these conflicting identity groups more specifically in post-colonial nations.
Identity, Colonialism, and Conflict
The psychological impact resulting from identity-loss trauma in post-colonial
Egypt is one extremely relevant component to the categorization process mentioned
above. This relates to how the empire building eras and the Western colonial period
affected Egyptians through the imposition of foreign rules and the rejection of cultural
compromises, which in turn suppresses native identities (Emig & Lindner, 2010;
Kambysellis, 1997; Slemon, 1996; Slemon & Tiffin, 1989; Bassett, 1994; Rodney, 1972).
Foreign ideas manifested through compulsory teaching of novel religious beliefs, such as
Romans teaching Egyptians Christianity and Arabs teaching them Islam, and merely due
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to the foreign presence through an unconscious adaptation of foreign cultural norms by
the indigenous population. Both imposed and unconsciously absorbed aspects are the
causes of novel manufactured identities that compensate for the pre-conquest lost identity
(Emig & Lindner, 2010; Kambysellis, 1997; Slemon & Tiffin, 1989; Rodney, 1972).
To explain, Shao-po Hsieh (1997) defines post-colonial as “the need, in groups
which have been victims of imperialism, to achieve an identity uncontaminated by
Eurocentric concepts and images” (p. 1). Indeed, for Egyptians, the conditions that
illegitimatized, interiorized, and endangered their identities led to the need for identity
restoration through the formation of counter-nationalisms. Yet, Shao-po Hsieh’s
definition slightly varies in the case of Egypt since, ironically, the immensely diverse
historical conquest provided the reference from which these identities formed (a notion I
expand more on in the discussion).
Consequently, as diverse post-colonial narratives for novel identities emerged,
intra-national group conflict emerged. In looking at how the basic mechanism of group
conflict operates, Kriesberg (2003) states, “For an inter-group (e.g., racial, ethnic, or
religious) conflict to occur, each side must believe the fight is between ‘us’ and ‘them’”
(p. 2), and as such, dissimilar Egyptian national identity groups antagonistically separated
themselves from each other. Moreover, conflicts that relate to territory, such as defining
national terrain, persist and immerse as part of the group’s identity, which leads
intractability (Burton, 1990; Kriesberg; Rothman, 1997). This dynamic was certainly
reflected in the relationships between the conflicting identity groups in Egypt during the
period between 2011 and 2014, as many exhibited a long-standing and nationally
publicized rivalry with little promise or intention for resolution on the horizon.
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Nationalism

According to Kriesberg (2003), resolutions for such intractable group conflicts
depend on the nature of the involved identities. Nationalistic degrees for example
determine how inclusive or exclusive the involved identity groups are. On one hand, less
nationalistic identities are inclusive identities and are predisposed to evade elongated
encounters. On the other hand, hard-core nationalists who tend to view their group as
majestic are far more exclusive and thus engage in elongated conflicts (Kriesberg, 2003).
Kriesberg confirms the above by saying:
Two groups with ethno-nationalist identities and with attachment to some of the
same land are prone to engage in an intractable conflict. However, a group with
an ethno-nationalist identity may avoid an intractable conflict with a group that
has identities emphasizing other worldly religious concerns. (p. 1)
Indeed, the intersection between colonialism and nationalism plays a vital role in
explaining much of the unfolding conflicts in postcolonial countries in general. As
mentioned, the power of industrialized Western nationalism is what led to the
competitive colonization of African countries. In turn, these colonized societies reacted
by creating a counter-nationalism, and this is certainly evident in the case of Egypt.
Therefore, as part of understanding the communication between the groups in Egypt it is
imperative to understand the parameters of nationalism, its power, and its ambiguity.
Harry Anastasiou (2008) defines nationalism saying, “Nationalism carries a view of the
nation that is absolute and sacred in value, monoethnic in nature, collectivist and
narcissistic in mentality, conflictual in predisposition, and militant in its concept of
defense and in its means of freedom” (153). As this view of the nation sets in, nationalists
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retreat into a “mythic world” (Anastasiou, 2003, p. 45), a concept at the core of the
nationalists’ mind-set that presumes a “divine election” (Cauthen, 2004, p. 20) and
determines how nationalists view the world. Cauthen says:
Nationalism, as an ideological movement that seeks autonomy, unity and identity
for a population deemed to be a nation, draws much of its passion, conviction and
intensity from the belief in a national mission and destiny; and this belief in turn
owes much to a powerful religious myth of ethnic election. (p. 25)
The mythical idea of being “chosen” lends an intoxicating agent for social
solidarity, national coherence, and political mobilization (Cauthen, 2004). To be chosen
is to be driven by a moral compulsion—ordained by ethnicity, history, and/or God—that
sets out a calling to which all members of the community must respond. Moreover,
failure to respond may invoke the possibility of eternal destruction or damnation. This
myth structures how history is perceived; it puts forward the notion of a continuing
historical narrative of the nation as descendants and heirs to the homeland (the State) of
their ancestors, whom share a common fate (Cauthen, 2004; Anastasiou, 2003, pp. 45–
46). The myth of being chosen is then further safeguarded by other nationalist myths such
as the superiority, inerrancy, and invincibility of the nation.
Moreover, the inflation of mythical beliefs, which is normally manifested through
media and educational systems, lends the concept of the nation as the supreme value an
effortlessly accepted sentiment. Additionally, symbols such as the national ﬂag, national
anthem, and national emblem represent a certain unity, history, and distinctiveness that
fortifies this sentiment (Podeh, 2011).
Podeh (2011) explains:
Sociologically, the flag constitutes a ‘summarising symbol’…such symbols sum
up, express and represent in an emotionally powerful and relatively
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undifferentiated way what the system means to its participants…In more concrete
terms, the roles of the flag in the modern era have been numerous. Firstly, it was
used to ‘evoke powerful emotions of identification with a group’…This
explanation is largely based on Emile Durkheim’s functionalist approach; in his
opinion, the flag – much like the tribal totem – ‘is the sign by which each clan
distinguishes itself from the others, the visible mark of its
personality’…Therefore, the flag is a symbol that allows individuals to express
their loyalty and allegiance to their group (nation), thereby strengthening the
solidarity among its members and at the same time distinguishing it from other
groups (nations)…In addition, the authoritative and sacred way in which the flag
is activated on ceremonial occasions serves to strengthen the bond between
members of the polity and that specific territory called homeland. The sacred
meaning attached to the flag through the use of fixed and repetitive liturgy…is
akin to performing a religious ritual…This ‘cult of the flag’ evokes powerful
emotional reactions and in some cases even leads to self-sacrifice. (p. 422)
These divine attributions to the nation-state lead to fragmentations in the

nationalist understanding of reality. The nationalist version of the nation’s history or
example becomes one of diachronic nature, a history that connects the nation’s past,
present, and future, a continuum of a legacy. The highlights of that history are the
nation’s triumphs in wars and revolutions and its great accomplishments. With this in
mind, the construction of the nationalist rhetoric and its power to mobilize is created.
Levinger and Lytle (2001) explain this mobilization rhetoric saying:
Virtually all rhetoric of national mobilisation contains three juxtaposed
elements…These three elements are framed within a series of binary oppositions,
contrasting the vision of an ideal past or future with the degraded present. The
project of national rebirth represents an inversion of the existing disordered
condition and a reconstitution of the ideal community. These binary oppositions
fuse in the form of a triad. (p. 178)
This triadic construction of comparing the idealized glorious past to the degraded present
is used to establish a standard utopian future to be reached and endorses the mechanism
of how nationalists call for mobilization and the enhancement of national armed forces
(Levinger & Lytle, 2011).
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The mobilization rhetoric acquires nationalism the capacity to muster citizens into

deadly movements while attributing loss of life to heroism and moral duty. This is
especially problematic within ethnically diverse nation-states, where if specific ideologies
are attributed to national identity, other identity groups suffer by becoming the outcast.
Questionable nationalist practices such as ethnic cleansing for example seek to create an
ideal community within a utopian future by restoring a presumed lost and glorious past.
This past, according to the nationalist mind, is only achievable through a reversal of the
circumstances that have tainted the present-day community. The monoethnic identity of
the nation as defined by ethnocentric nationalism inevitably suppresses diversity within
society, viewing it as problematic and unacceptable (Anastasiou, 2008; Dingley, 2011).
Nasserism
The above lends a strong elucidation as to why Egypt’s 2011 conflict groups
would strive to define a single identity for Egypt. Yet, it is important to understand that
these nationalistic definitions pre-date the 2011 conflict. To exemplify, one of the many
forms of Egyptian secular nationalism is Nasserism, a nationalist political ideology
founded and led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s second president and a leader in the
Egyptian revolution of 1952. Though aware of Egypt’s Islamic and Christian identities,
Nasserism was a secular Pan-Arab ideology that utilized a form of socialism labeled
“Arab socialism,” promoting modernization and industrial development. Nasserism also
encompassed components of republicanism, anti-imperialism, and transnational nonalignment, and hence, it opposed both Western capitalism and communism on the basis
that they were incompatible with Arab customs (Ajami, 1974; Podeh & Winckler, 2004).
Nasser also viewed Zionism as an extension of European colonialism on Arab territory,
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yet he was against Islamic groups who shared the same feeling toward Zionism but
clashed with his secular ideology (Ajami, 1974; Mansfield, 1973; Podeh & Winckler,
2004; “Nasserism,” n.d.).
Seen as an overthrow to colonial Western influences, the Suez Canal
nationalization by Nasser in 1956 validated Nasserism and motivated its members to
expand the ideology beyond Egyptian borders. The ideology hence affected other parts of
the developing world, particularly with respect to anti-imperialism. Hugo Chávez, the late
president of Venezuela, cited Nasserism as a direct influence on his own political
thinking. Chávez spoke highly of the ex-Egyptian president saying:
Someone talked to me about his pessimism regarding the future of Arab
nationalism. I told him that I was optimistic, because the ideas of Nasser are still
alive…To say the least; I am a Nasserist, ever since I was a young soldier.
(Nasserism,” n.d., p. 3)
Additionally, British politician George Galloway glorified Nasser as “one of the greatest
men of the 20th Century” (Nasserism,” n.d., p. 3) and has encouraged Arab governments
to hold the beliefs of his ideology (Ajami, 1974; Podeh & Winckler, 2004; Nasserism,”
n.d., p. 3).
In the later years however, The Arab defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 injured
Nasserism as a protective national ideology. Hence, Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat,
abandoned certain aspects of Nasserism during what he labeled the “Corrective
Revolution”, but endorsed its pan-Arab component. Later, under the three-decade ruling
of Sadat’s beneficiary Hosni Mubarak, Pan-Arabism continued to thrive, but Nasserism
as a whole was confined to writers, intellectuals, and opposition parties (Shehadi & Mills,
1988; Sheikh, 2003). During the 2011 Egyptian conflict, the Karama Party of Nasserist
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Hamdeen Sabahi styled itself as the successor to Nasser and contended in the 2012
Egyptian presidential elections. However, present-day Nasserists, with their advertised
support for democracy, human rights, and equality, market the ideology as less
authoritarian than during Nasser’s period, and explain Nasser’s autocratic approach as
necessary to execute his revolutionary actions (Podeh & Winckler, 2004).
There is more than one example of Egyptian counter nationalism that formed
around the early 1900s, such as pan-Islamism and liberalism influenced nationalisms, all
of which are explained in more detail in the discussion section and how they relate to the
impasses of 2011.
Arrogance, Violence, and Distrust
Counter-nationalism was one of two relevant postcolonial products in Egypt that
are vital to highlight for the purpose of this thesis. The other significant product of the
aggressive pursuit of intercontinental colonies is reflected in the psychological burden on
the indigenous identity. Colonization for instance allowed for the emergence of ethnic
superiority, where the conqueror obtained privileges over the indigenous majority. It
denied the conquered people the capability for both self-rule and self-growth.
Colonialism was also a passageway of showing racial arrogance, demeaning leaders and
their people while encouraging rivalry and competition. As Fisher and Sharp (2004)
explain, individuals conceal these feelings of inferiority and compensate for them by
projecting insuperability, and thus, a natural disposition toward arrogant conduct is
conceived.
The failure of post-colonial Egyptian society to utilize dialogical ventures as a
means of conflict resolution, both on the interpersonal and the political levels, is partly
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attributed to the inclination toward arrogant behaviors. Arrogance evokes a pro-debate,
competitive and inerrant orientation, and as result, hinders the ability of accepting other
truths. Moreover, the nationalistic mentality, in which one’s own version of nationhood
and statehood surpasses any other version, indeed sustains and reinforces post-colonial
arrogance.
If arrogance as a mechanism of concealing inferiority fails, individuals move to
the other layers of pride preservation and gaining power, such as name-calling and
violence (Fisher & Sharp, 2004). This notion clearly played out in the Egyptian conflict
between 2011 and 2014 by evidence of dialogues converting to settings of exchanged
insults, and in some cases physical clashes that led to further violence amid supporters of
each side. This contributes to a conflict’s escalation and the eventual outcome of utter
mistrust. The level of distrust depends on the number of violations and the perception of
the victim in relation to the intention of the offender. Lewicki and Tomlinson (2003) say:
Distrust is the confident expectation that another individual’s motives, intentions,
and behaviors are sinister and harmful to one’s own interests. In interdependent
relationships, this often entails a sense of fear and anticipation of discomfort or
danger. Distrust naturally prompts us to take steps that reduce our vulnerability in
an attempt to protect our interests. Accordingly, our distrust of others is likely to
evoke a competitive (as opposed to cooperative) orientation that stimulates and
exacerbates conflict. (paras. 1)
In the analysis section I show how repeated clashes amid the rising counter
nationalisms in Egypt has led to distrust, which plays a central role in dialogical failures
even if one side attempts in good faith to rebuild relations. This is because once
conceived, distrust formulates a prevailing framework on successive events in the
relationship between the parties of conflict in such a way that “even good faith efforts by
the offender to restore the relationship are met with skepticism and suspicion” (Lewicki
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& Tomlinson, 2003, p. 1). Furthermore, the upshot of constant cynicism is a selffulfilling anticipation, parties react violently to each other merely based on suspicion,
which in turn translates to the victimized side as further proof of warranted distrust
(Lewicki, McAllister, & Beis, 1998; Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt,
& Camerer, 1998).
Competition, Collaboration, and Communication
The problem with clashing forms of nationalism and arrogance within
postcolonial countries is that they increase the chances of communal disagreements that
lead to distrust. Additionally, the recurring manners in which parties approach these
disagreements are central to fostering either a coexisting or a polarizing environment.
Deutsch & Coleman (2000) relay that most situations of disagreement have a mix of both
competition and cooperation. Perceptibly, nationalism and arrogance push parties more
towards a competitive approach to most disputes, and hence overtime promote a
polarizing environment. However, there are also certain other dynamics that lead parties
to utilize either competition or cooperation, which if understood may hint towards vital
angles for trust building, a deconstruction of both nationalism and arrogance, and
eventually positive contact.
Deutsch’s theory of competition and cooperation rests on two basic ideas: The
first relates to the interdependency of the positive and negative goals of the parties
involved, and the second relates to the type of actions taken by the involved parties.
Positive goals are goals that, if achieved, benefit both sides, and negative goals are goals
that, if achieved by one side, result in an obstruction to the other side’s goals. Deutsch
highlights that if the goals of two individuals or groups are completely independent of
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one another, no conflict arises; therefore, the existence of a conflict implies some form of
goal interdependency (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000). Positive interdependence can be a
result of people’s cultural jive or need to overcome joint difficulties, and the opposite is
true vis-à-vis negative interdependence. Deutsch explains that irregularities may occur in
the level of goal interdependence; what side A does may have a considerable effect on
side B, but what side B does may have little impact on side A. Thus, this power dynamic
becomes key in handling disagreements (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).
Moreover, the types of actions taken by the involved parties fall into two types:
“effective” and “bungling” actions (Deutsch, 2001, p. 77). Effective actions are the ones
that improve one side’s chances of attaining its goal, and bungling actions are the ones
that worsen one side’s chances of attaining its goal. Depending on the context of the
relationship, individuals may choose to aid the other side’s effective actions or to be
satisfied with the other sides bundling actions. For instance, if one side views the
effective actions by the other side as beneficial to its goals; they are likely to aid the other
side in doing those actions. Similarly, if one side views the other side’s bungling action
as harmful to its own goals, they are likely to aid the other side in avoiding those
bundling actions.
Effective and bungling actions affect three main areas—substitutability, attitudes,
and inducibility—that are the deciding factor of whether parties approach conflict
cooperatively or competitively. Substitutability is how one party’s actions satisfy another
party’s intentions; it licenses individuals to acknowledge the activities of others in
fulfilling their needs. Thus, negative substitutability involves active efforts to counter the
activities of opposing parties. Attitudes refer to the predisposed outlook of the involved
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parties to respond to aspects of their environment, either favorably or unfavorably.
Inducibility is the readiness to accept the other parties’ influences, whereas negative
inducibility refers to the readiness to obstruct what others want. Substitutability, attitudes,
and inducibility are vital to the breakdown of the social and mental discourses involved in
casting the effects of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 2001).
Group conflict theory is another way of explaining Deutsch’s positive and
negative goal dynamic. It rests on the premise of competition over scarce resources and
not human nature. To exemplify, an experiment at a children summer camp divided
children into two groups competing over scarce resources, which resulted in fistfights
among the children, who initially showed no signs of animosity against each other.
Experimentalists decided to re-create goals that were captivating to members of the two
groups but could not be attained by the resources and energies of either group
independently. These goals, known as “superordinate goals” (Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher,
2008, p. 472), caused the animosity to disappear and developed friendships amid the
children (Nadler et al., 2008).
The tit-for-tat strategy is another example of the interdependency of goals
between conflicting parties. Experts simulated a situation in which one side highlights the
benefit of cooperation on both sides’ positive goals by acting cooperatively, and
thereafter encourages the other side to copy their move (Poundstone, 1992). The tit-fortat strategy shows that either side can stimulate its opponent to act competitively or
cooperatively depending on how they behave when it is their turn to act.
One key factor then in the positive and negative goal dynamic is the conflict
parties’ view of possible outcomes for their disagreement. A zero-sum mentality—a loser
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and a winner outcome vs. a win-win outcome—is an approach that constitutes a
competitive nature for each party to reach its goals. This mentality obviously is sustained
by both nationalism and arrogance. Coleman and Deutsch (2015) explain that as
competition takes conflicts towards damaging paths, they perpetuate by “autistic
hostility” (p. 42), a self-propagating psychological process caused by a communication
shutdown and misinterpretations. This pushes conflict parties into fabricated assumptions
about each other that are in the end embodied by comparable actions—a process of selffulfilling prophecies as mentioned above. As a result, the creation of evil images begins
to form on both sides of the conflict, and in return, disarmament becomes difficult
without a feeling of venerability (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000).
On this distressed communication, Anastasiou (2007) posits that suspicion codes
information through the viewpoint of concealed motives, shaped in terms of intentions
and less in terms of subject. With deepening mistrust, the situation begins to make
exchanges that increasingly separate, and if tumbled into violence, the parties then slip
into flawed perceptions, as pain becomes the primary reference for facts (Anastasiou,
2007). As both sides are alienated, the sole experience that they have of each other
becomes the sum of incidences of hostility, and the profound meaning that violence
communicates replaces all messages by false assumptions. Over time, this leads each side
to demonize the “enemy other,” which licenses killing. Propaganda becomes the only
reality that affirms moral rightness, and truth becomes contradictory; one side’s hero is
the other side’s villain and vice versa (Anastasiou, 2007).
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Contact Theory

If however parties are able to visualize a win-win scenario, and hence utilize one
of the collaborative tactics mentioned above, it may provide an opportunity for trust
building. In turn, it may open the doors to possible effective dialogue that can aid in the
deconstruction of both nationalism and arrogance. In contrast, an imagined win-win
outcome triggers a realization of possible common interests and interdependent
objectives (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000). A constructive path that alienated conflict parties
can take in order to begin differentiating negative motives from legitimate concerns are
joint ventures that result in positive contact. These ventures may lead each side to face
the fact that the enemies have also experienced agony. This increased affiliation washes
away the discriminatory assumptions of conflict-accustomed knowledge, hence
generating a new world of positive possibilities fostered by collaborative efforts
(Anastasiou, 2007).
This intergroup contact hypothesis was initially developed by Gordon W. Allport
in 1954 and expanded by many researchers. Known as Intergroup Contact Theory, the
process has shown in some cases to reduce prejudice and promote integrated
perspectives. The premise Allport states is that under opportune conditions if
communication between in-groups and out-groups transpires, then participants are able to
recognize diverse outlooks relating to their ways of life. A consequence of this new
understanding is a diminishment of stereotyping issues, deleterious assumptions, and
restrictive prejudices (Brown & Hewstone, 2005).
However, in order for post-violence anxiety to decrease and familiarity to take its
place, contact situations need to be recurrent, consistent, and long enough. Additionally,
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some scholars say that if the members of the two groups use this contact setting to
exchange insults, argue with each other, resort to physical violence, and discriminate
against each other, then contact will likely not reduce the conflict. To obtain the
beneficial effects, the situation must include positive contact embedded in criteria that
include equal status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, support of authorities, and
personal interaction (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). However, there are some scholars
whom have argued that even heated argumentative forms of dialogue may be beneficial
over no form of communication, something I explore briefly in the recommendation
section of this thesis.
Dialogue
One form that embodies contact between conflicting parties is the engagement in
positive dialogue. However, having a clear understanding of the term dialogue within the
realm of conflict resolution is essential for both the facilitator and the participants. In
transnational peace building, the word dialogue is often reciprocal with discussion,
negotiation, and political discourse. In effort to distinguish dialogue within the conflict
resolution context, Feller and Ryan (2012) highlight eight core traits in the makeup of an
effective dialogical approach. These traits are coexistence, movement, encountering the
“other,” assumption, creativity and flexibility, sharing, holistic, and multigenerational
(Feller & Ryan, 2012).
Bar-Tal (2004) defines coexistence as “a state of mind shared by society members
who recognize the rights of another group to exist peacefully as a legitimate, equal
partner with whom disagreements have to be resolved in nonviolent ways” (p. 253).
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Coexistence as a trait of dialogue fits as a primary motive for human interaction. Feller
and Ryan (2012) cite communication scholar Kenneth Burke and say that the motive for
communication is the hope to be fully experienced and recognized by others; dialogue
participants are deeply motivated because they want to be understood. Therefore, the
desire for coexistence is always present, which provides facilitators with a natural desire
to bring participants together.
While coexistence is the motivation for dialogue, the second trait of dialogue,
movement, is the manifestation of its exercise. Movement can be literal in the sense that
conflicting parties must walk onto an actual cross-country border or known physical
spaces that divide two communities. Crisscrossing conflict lines leads to other figurative
movements, such as movement by intermixing social interests, sharing histories and
traditions, and creating an awareness of the fruitfulness of the experience.
Encountering is understood as a deliberate involvement by both parties in the
specific agenda of bringing up the conflict. Participants suddenly find themselves with
whom they identify as the enemy, and then are suddenly exposed to a dissimilar
consideration for reality other than their own. This experience allows both sides to speak
and fully hear about each other’s ideologies, perceptions, and understandings of history,
especially as they relate to the conflict. This opens possibilities for change, where the
circumstances are viewed less through moral lenses and more through a “benefits all”
lens (Feller & Ryan, 2012).
On assumptions, Feller and Ryan (2012) cite Bohm’s explanation that dialogue
serves as a means to evaluate our perceptions in collaboration with others. Bohm refers to
that practice metaphorically as though perceptions are suspended as clouds in front of
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participants so they could be critically evaluated with the help of others. Feller and Ryan
say that Bohm identifies a special relationship between thinking and speech as central to
dialogue; he recognizes that dialogue is fundamentally a practice of examining thought
together—a process leading to new ways of thinking. Regarding creativity and flexibility,
pedagogical professionals have long recognized the significance of creative arts as
avenues to access challenging material. Moreover, psychologists claim that creative
methods “allow the subconscious and the conscious mind to better communicate” (Feller
and Ryan, 2012, p. 360). Modern neuroscience suggests that engaging in artistic practice
allows the brain to change wave production, increasing flexibility; that is, the more
individuals think creatively, the more flexibility the thinking has, which is a prerequisite
for the ability to negotiate conflict (Feller and Ryan, 2012).
The last two traits, holistic and multigenerational, mean to think of dialogue
happening on all generational and social levels of society. For effective dialogue to take
place, actioners ought to consider casting a wider net even if that means dialing down the
intensity on all levels rather than intensifying the experience on one level. The thinking
process must be holistic. As Feller and Ryan (2012) state, “If you have a conﬂict, identify
24 points where you can do something. And better to do a little bit with all 24, than one
giant step with one of them” (p. 363). In other words, think of the conflict as an entire
body that needs mobilization. In order for it to move forward, all components must
improve, even if slightly. By checking all the components, the body moves forward as a
whole. In contrast, by checking off only one component, even if improved to its
maximum, the body as a whole stays immobilized. More so, immobilized components
have tendencies to negatively influence repaired ones. That is to say, if one level of
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society is engaging in dialogue, for example, the top level, and grass roots are not, or one
generation is and the other is not, then the level not engaging has the capacity to eradicate
all accomplishments at the engaging level (Feller and Ryan, 2012).
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Chapter 3
Methodology

This thesis poses the question, how does communication between the narratives
shaping the events in Egypt since the 2011 revolution elucidate Egypt’s current state of
affairs? Because the research question focuses on the communicative exchanges between
the narratives involved in the 2011 conflict, I chose to engage in qualitative research that
relied on vocal and textual excerpts exchanged amid the involved parties during the
period between 2011 and 2014. While researching several methodologies, I discovered
critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of
discourse that views language as a form of social practice; how the diverse motives of
social beings creates and alters the world that they live in (Fairclough, 2012; Koller,
2012). I was interested in a form of CDA that was recognized for investigating political
identities through a historical lens, and as a result, I used the discourse historical
approach (DHA) for my inquiry. I utilized the main elements of DHA (described
below) — contextualization, critique, discursive strategies and triangulation (Wodak &
Boukala, 2015) to collect and analyze the communicative excerpts of the conflict actors.
Contextualization
The first element of the DHA, Contextualization, is reference to placing single
communication within a large historical scope, and for that purpose, timelines were an
exceptionally helpful tool in providing a visual aid for identifying cause-and-effect
relationships between contemporary and historic events. I started by sketching a timeline
for the events between 2011 and 2014 and titled it the “Conflict-Timeline”. The events
highlighted on the timeline represented moments during the conflict when conversations
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intensified, referred to as “flare points.” A set of flare points clustered together then
generated a list of different topics.
Emerging topics of contention included the Egyptian constitution, EgyptianIsraeli relations, decisions regarding election processes, disbarments on election
candidates, and accusations surrounding violent clashes and human rights defilements.
Yet, projecting that an inclusion of all the topics would dilute each individual topic, and
in turn dilute the research as a whole, I decided to make a case for my thesis using only
one topic: the constitution as an element of domestic policy. My decision to focus on the
constitution related to two factors. First, it represented the most frequent topic of
controversy, and second, arguments involving other topics appeared to have stemmed
from quarrels regarding the constitution.
Furthermore, realizing that conversations related to the constitution within the
conflict-timeline extend back into the Mubarak and pre-Mubarak eras, I created a second
and third timeline. The second timeline, labeled the “Mubarak-Timeline,” accounted for
the Mubarak regime’s formation and conclusion, and the third timeline, labeled the
“Republic-Timeline,” accounted for Egypt’s partial independence from the British in
1920 and up until the beginning of the Mubarak era. The purpose was to capture
additional flare points linked to the topic of the constitution in order to render a greater
understanding to the conflict-timeline arguments.
Critique
The second element of the DHA, Critique, refers to the ability to allow an analysis
that is far from the researcher’s biases. This was essential, since as an Egyptian native I
am most likely conditioned by one or more Egyptian national narrative. The use of

COMPETING	
  NARRATIVES	
  	
  

30
critique aided me in selecting the communication excerpts for analysis while minimizing
my own biases towards the speakers and their perspectives. I aimed at collecting excerpts
that followed and contextualized the flow of the 2011-2014 discourse, yet ones that also
fit certain criteria. First, I targeted excerpts reported by the speaker directly or reputable
news sources, such as public speeches. Second, I made sure to the best of my knowledge
that all the communications reported on behalf of a speaker had not been denied by the
speaker, and if so, I excluded it from the analysis. Third, I read every communication
paying less attention to the author’s political ideological background, and with no
particular intention other than it related to a view regarding the constitution. Forth, I
utilized an Arabic-English translator to revise all Arabic communications in order to
diminish the prejudices in my own translation and interpretation. Fifth, critique helped
me step away from the arbitrator role, the role of identifying right from wrong. On the
contrary, it helped me focus on asking why conflict actors believe what they say to be
true.
Finally, I held presentations displaying some of the hypotheses and
communication excerpts for a diverse group of students at Portland State University.
Some of the students were native Egyptians, others were from the Middle East, and
others were from the United States. This invited challenging questions and reflective
discussions that have conveyed insider and outsider perspectives on the hypothesis and
the interpretation of the communications selected for analysis. Generally, the
observations and claims I was putting forward were not in a sense extremely
controversial or radical. For example, proposing that one group dislikes or demonizes
another group, or that they advocated a certain form of statehood, did not need more than
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a few communications to prove, as they communicated it clearly and undeniably through
each excerpt.
Triangulation
The third component of the DHA, Triangulation, as Wodak and Boukala (2015)
describe, is a key principle of the DHA that “enables researchers to minimize ‘cherrypicking’ due to its endeavor to work on the basis of a variety of genres, methods of
analysis, theories and background information” (p. 93). Triangulation is the act of
merging numerous intersecting research methods that complement and challenge each
other in the study of a particular subject. This creates checks and balances to the upshot
of each technique, attributing a truer account to the findings. Wodak (2000) explains that
triangulation “attempts to transcend the pure linguistic dimension and to include more or
less systematically the historical, political, sociological and/or psychological dimension
in the analysis, theory and interpretation of a specific discursive occasion” (p. 5).
I utilized triangulation in the sense that I approached my analysis from a varying
range of disciplinary perspectives. I selected dissertations, journals, books, and videos
that focused on history, psychology, and economics, rather than purely conflict resolution,
to be a part of my literature review and as an analysis lens. Thus, I was able to analyze
the same communication from a range of viewpoints, psychology, body language,
economics, historical relevance, and social literature.
Moreover, I used excerpts from communications and literature published
subsequent to the Egyptian conflict of 2011, I also used publications dating before the
conflict’s instigation. This was done to include perspectives, specifically on the origins of
the conflict, the origins of the conflict actors, and the behaviors of the parties involved,
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from individuals who had not yet witnessed the conflict. This allowed me to conclude
that these pre-conflict behavioral depictions are untainted by futuristic agendas, which
could be the case for current publications now that the conflict has occurred. This
inclusion filtered out possibilities of authors reshaping past events to explain future
events.
Lastly, the use of a mixture of text and video sources helped create a multilayered
analysis. For example, video communication helped me reexamine textual
communication, and textual communication helped me examine how publications report
video communication. I also utilized the element of third party interpretation that I
utilized as part of my researcher critique to add or revise the meaning of selected
communication.
Discursive Strategies (Topoi)
The forth component of the DHA, Discursive Strategies, are processes that
identify certain schemes employed by political speakers in order to convince their
audience of the claims they put forward. Wodak and Boukala (2015) highlight three
examples of those discursive strategies in the following:
Referential strategies which focus on membership categorization devices, such as
biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors…in order to represent
social actors and especially in-groups and out-groups; predicational strategies
attribute negative or positive, stereotypical characteristics to social actors; and
argumentation strategies through which positive and negative attributions are
justified and legitimized. (pp. 93–94)
The main tool I focused on was the argumentation strategies (or topoi) employed
because they were sufficient to establish the existence of the varying narratives and the
nature of their relationships. Wodak and Boukala (2015) define topoi saying:
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… the concept of topos is salient in this context for the analysis of sometimes
fallacious and sometimes reasonable arguments which are widely adopted in
prejudiced and discriminatory discourses…Following the Aristotelian tradition,
we approach topos (pl. topoi) as a rhetorical and dialectical scheme that offers the
opportunity for a systematic in-depth analysis of different arguments and
statements that represent the accepted knowledge—endoxon—and which are
usually employed by orators or opponents to persuade their audience of the
validity of their opinions. Topoi are thus defined as parts of argumentation which
belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable, premises. As such they
justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion
(Kienpointner 1996, 562). Hence, a topos should be understood as a quasi
‘elliptic’ argument (an enthymeme), where the premise is followed by the
conclusion without giving any explicit evidence, while taking the conclusion to
confirm, and relate to, the presupposed endoxon. (p. 94)
Topoi also demonstrate imperative limitations in the discursive construction of identities,
which are based on imagined and sometimes flawed perceptions of reality (a salient
component in my study)(Wodak & Boukala, 2015). Some examples of topos include the
topos of threat, the topos of definition, and the topos of national responsibility, each of
which is explained when used in the analysis.
The results from the analysis identified the conflict players’ profiles and
ideological backgrounds; their attempts to polarize and dehumanize each other; and
elements of rigidity and nationalism. The emerging themes from the analysis were then
used to draft an extensive and supporting literature review. These results were used to
draft an analysis section that draws-upon my major claims along with the supporting
excerpts and literature. Then, an in-depth interpretation of the root causes of the claims I
put forth in the analysis are explored in a discussion section along with all historical
supporting evidence. Conclusively, the analysis and the discussion helped formulate a
thesis statement that is in essence an answer to the thesis research question, along with a
recommendation section.
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Chapter 4
Analysis and Discussion

Before starting the analysis, it is vital to clarify that I do not claim to have
captured all the voices and topics discussed during the events between 2011 and 2014
relating to the Egyptian conflict. As described above, my methodology allowed me to
collect and analyze many excerpts relating to many topics using three different timelines.
My selection for the excerpts represented in this analysis focuses on key groups that to
my knowledge have influenced masses in one direction or another regarding a centerstage topic: rewriting the Egyptian constitution. Moreover, the excerpts I chose to
highlight in the analysis below are merely strong examples of a larger pool of excerpts,
some of which may add to my proposition (varying narratives attempting to reshape
Egyptian identity through the constitution), or tell other stories about the conflict. After
my study, I can strongly claim that while these stories may add other dimensions to the
conflict, I believe they would not contradict the propositions I put forth.
Similarly, the examples of conflict actors I mention below are only popular
models of many other similar figures that have encouraged the same rhetoric. Here, it is
important to also highlight that while I present some conflict actors as capitalists, liberals,
or Islamists, this does not necessarily mean they identify as such. In fact, some
individuals presented in this thesis have on certain occasions identified with an ideology
that contradicts my placement, such as hardcore secular nationalists supporting the
military identifying as liberals, and hardcore religious nationalists identifying as
democrats. Thus, it is important to clarify that my placement for individuals within
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certain narratives purely relies on their consistent views and actions on the issues relating
to the constitution between 2011 and 2014.
This disclaimer represents some of the challenges to my research, the challenge to
include all topics related to the conflict, and the challenge of a hasty generalization about
the conflict actors’ ideologies, which would conclude an extremely lengthy and perhaps
misleading research. Instead, I want to explain that I suffice by providing models of what
I believe to be the most effective excerpts, communicated by popular actors, regarding a
prevalent topic of controversy that evidently convey my findings and their position
during this particular period. Thus, I attempt to avert these challenges by acknowledging
the complexity and the danger of enclosing certain individuals inevitably within one
narrative so as to not mislead my readers.
With that in mind, in Egypt’s 2011-2014 constitutional struggle, three narratives
take the forefront; those narratives are the democratic, Islamist, and secular narratives
(Each further described below). I refer to those narratives as “master-narratives,” grand
narratives that bundle multiple “sub-narratives” with parallel views on the constitution.
To illustrate, the democratic narrative encompasses liberals, left-wing activists, and
young revolutionaries; the Islamist narrative encompasses the Muslim Brotherhood, the
Salafists, and Al-Azhar scholars or Sufis; and the secular narrative encompasses the
military, capitalists, and Coptic Christians. This bundling method sheds light on the
varying levels of rigidity within the alliances, and identifies intergroup and intragroup
disagreements and connections that can cornerstone resolution propositions. In the
following, I provide brief profiles of each master-narrative, an overview of the Egyptian
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constitutional history, and an account of the events between January 2011 and January
2014 in order to support the understanding of the propositions I will present.
The Master-Narrative Profiles
The Secular Narrative
The first sub-narrative in the secular master-narrative is the Egyptian military,
which, according to an article of the Egyptian constitution, belongs to the people, and its
duty is to preserve Egypt’s security and territories (“Constitutional History of Egypt,”
n.d.). As provided for in most Egyptian constitutions, with the exception of the
provisional 2011 constitution and the 2012 constitution, the supreme commander of the
armed forces is the president of the republic. Since the revolution of 1952, Egypt’s
leaders—Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak—were all ex-military
officers (Lynch, 2013). An example of a military conflict actor is General Abdel Fattah
Al-Sisi, who was head of Egypt’s Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance
Administration before the 2011 revolution, and became Egypt’s fifth president in 2014
(“Egypt: Abdul Fattah al-Sisi Profile,” 2014).
The second sub-narrative in the secular master-narrative are the capitalists, who
advocate for a militant state, approves the use of excessive force as a means of security,
and adheres to a capitalist objective. An example of a capitalist conflict actor is journalist
and writer Mustafa Bakri, who holds a graduate diploma in political, legal, and economic
systems from an Egyptian university and is the editor in chief of the independent
newspaper El-Aosboa. He also hosts a program, Facts and Secrets, on Sada el-Balad TV.
He has published numerous books, such as The Army and the Revolution, The Army and
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the Muslim Brotherhood, The Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al-Sisi: The Way to
Restore the Egyptian State. Bakri may refer to himself as a democrat or a socialist, yet his
reactions to the constitutional draft, along with his support for the military and the
capitalist agenda, safely places him within the secular master-narrative for the purpose of
this thesis.
The third sub-narrative in the secular master-narrative is the Coptic Christian
community, which, while a religious group, corroborates with the military and secularism
for fear of the Islamization of the state by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood
(Emirates Center Strategic Studies and Research, 2017). Its belief regarding its role,
rights, and ties with Egypt rests within the introduction of Christianity in Egypt reflected
in the historical narrative mentioned in the introduction. Key actors representing the
Coptic community are Pope Shenouda III of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria,
and Anba Morqos, the official representative of the church. Another example of a Coptic
Christian figure is Egyptian billionaire businessperson Naguib Sawiris. He is the
chairman of Weather Investments's parent company, and chairman of Orascom Telecom
Media and Technology Holding S.A.E. and also serves on several Boards, committees
and councils, as well as an extremely popular and VIP person in Egypt. Sawiris markets
himself politically as liberal, yet, his views on particular elements of the constitution
places him within the Coptic Christian sub-group, particularly because of the public’s
opinion of his views.
Key characteristics of the secular master-narrative include the separation between
church and state, modernization, industrialization, concentration on Arab values rather
than Muslim values, a hunger for economic dominance, negligence for human rights, and
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firm support for the military and national security. Most proponents of secularism
emphasize the link between secularism and national unity, specifically between Coptic
Christians and Muslims.
The Islamic Narrative
On the other hand, the first sub-narrative in the Islamists master-narrative is the
Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is a global Sunni Islamist organization with an
identified aim to inculcate Sharia law (Islamic law) and the Sunnah (the ways of Islam’s
prophet Mohamed) as the basis for community and state affairs. Its mottos include “Islam
is the solution” (Patel, 2007, p.127) and “Allah is our objective; the Qur’an is the
Constitution; the Prophet is our leader; jihad is our way; death for the sake of Allah is our
wish” (Ali, 2011). As a Pan-Islamic movement, it believes Islamic governments must
eventually unify in a caliphate system and regain Islam’s manifest destiny, an empire
stretching from Spain to Indonesia. The Brotherhood is the most Islamic group involved
in politics; it preaches that Islam will bring social justice and the eradication of poverty
and corruption (Zeghal, 1999). A Brotherhood conflict actor is the Brotherhood’s
political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and Mohamed Morsi, the party’s
lead spokesperson and presidential nominee in 2012.
The second sub-narrative in the Islamist master-narrative is the Salafists, which is
an ultra-conservative movement within Sunni Islam. The movement takes its name from
the Arabic term salaf, or “predecessors,” identifying the earliest Muslims believed to
provide the epitome of Islamic practice. A narration by the Prophet Muhammad praising
the people of his own generation and the people of the succeeding two generations is
viewed as a call to Muslims to follow the example of those first three generations known
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as the Salaf. The Salafi movement’s conservatism is considered a less violent hybrid of
Wahhabism and is therefore feared in Egypt (Osama bin Laden was a Wahhabist). While
the majority of Salafists avoid politics and is more concerned with how laws restrict their
abilities to practice Islam, some Salafi youths saw themselves as revolutionaries and
chose actions ranging from militant jihadism to protest politics (Brown, 2011; Zeghal,
1999).
The third sub-narrative of the Islamist master-narrative is the Sufis, who are
viewed as moderate diviners absorbed in spirituality rather than in politics. Sufism is not
a distinct Islamic sect; it is a different focus of practicing Islam and is the default Muslim
religious life in Egypt. The Sufi community spawns from Al-Azhar University, which,
according to a 2011 report issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is
strongly Sufi in character (Brown, 2011; El-Houdaiby, 2012). In 1961, the selection of
the university’s Grand Sheik (leader) became a presidential appointee, who gave the
Grand Sheik the responsibility for assigning graduates of Al-Azhar as leaders to all major
mosques. Major mosque leaders hence became state employees who recognize its
superiority and legitimize its policies, and only issue temperate edicts (fatwās) on
disputes regarding religious Islamic practices in Egypt that parallels its political agendas.
Consequently, vast portions of the self-governing Brotherhood and Salafists mosques
view them goadingly as puppets of the status quo (Abu-Rabi’, 1988; Albo, 2012; Brown,
2011; El-Houdaiby, 2012; Zeghal, 1999). A Sufi 2011 conflict actor is the Grand Sheik
of Al-Azhar Mosque, Ahmed al-Tayeb.
The Democratic Narrative
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For the Democratic Master narrative, it is important to highlight that there is a
vast distinction between the definition of Middle Eastern democracy and western
democracy. Meaning that while political individuals in Egypt may call themselves
democratic, what that mainly entails is their desire for a non-religious and non-militant
state. Yet, when it comes to human rights, environmental care, inclusiveness and equity,
the level of attention and advocacy for those details is trivial in comparison to western
democratic liberals and socialists. Most Egyptian democrats are fundamentalists for the
same reasons when it comes to their tolerance of other beliefs and ideologies within
Egypt.
With this preface, the first sub-narrative in the democratic master-narrative are the
liberals, and because of the interchangeability and ambiguity between the terms liberal,
socialist, and leftist in Egypt, I will suffice by giving examples of three conflict actors
whom have identified as either. One example is former director general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr.
Mohamed ElBaradei. ElBaradei was born in Egypt and earned a bachelor’s degree in law
at the University of Cairo and a doctorate in international law at New York University
School of Law. He launched his career in the Egyptian diplomatic service, serving in the
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations in New York and Geneva, where he
was in charge of political, legal, and arms control issues. From 1974 to 1978, Dr.
ElBaradei was a special assistant to the foreign minister of Egypt and was a member of
the negotiating team that led to the conclusion of the disengagement agreements between
Egypt and Israel (International Atomic Energy Agency, n.d.).
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Another figure is Amr Hamzawy, who studied political science and
developmental studies in Cairo and Berlin. He was previously a senior associate in the
Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the research
director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon. He also served as faculty
at the American University in Cairo, at Cairo University, and at Stanford University. His
research, teaching, and academic publications about Egypt focus on democratization
processes, civil society, and human rights and governance. Hamzawy is also a former
member of the Egyptian National Council for Human Rights and contributes a weekly
op-ed to the Egyptian independent newspaper Al-Shorouk (“Amr Hamzawy,” n.d.).
Writer Alaa al-Aswany is another figure representing the democratic masternarrative. Al-Aswany, the author of the Arab world’s highest-selling book ever, The
Yacoubian Building, is a reasoned but uncompromising critic of the Egyptian government
and the religious extremists aligned against it, as well as Western leaders whose
condemnation of oppressive dictatorships is too often inconsistently applied. AlAswany’s World Affairs blog focuses on global and regional issues related to politics,
security, and human rights. Al-Aswany speaks Arabic, English, French, and Spanish, and
his work is published in 24 languages worldwide. He originally trained as a dentist and
has a practice in Cairo, where he resides (“Alaa al-Aswany,” n.d.).
The other sub-narrative in the democratic master-narrative is the group of young
revolutionaries, such as the grassroots movement Tamarod, or “rebellion” (“Profile:
Egypt’s Tamarod Protest Movement,” 2013). Ideologically, liberals/socialists/leftists and
young revolutionaries fiercely advocate for a democratic state and social equality, and
will just as much criticize the military and government corruption as they do the Islamists.

COMPETING	
  NARRATIVES	
  	
  

42

They condemn use of excessive force and absolutism, thus placing a high value on
human rights, parliamentarism, freedom of speech, and equal distribution of wealth, yet
mostly in theory as mentioned above (Abdel Kouddous, 2013; Kirkpatrick & Sheikh,
2012; Masoud & Nawara, 2012).
The Constitution
The purpose of providing the conflict actors’ profiles is to aid in the
understanding of their position on the topic of contention, which is the constitution.
Likewise, a brief understanding of the constitutional history of Egypt serves the same
purpose. The constitutional history of Egypt dates back to when the Ottomans ruled
Egypt, and due to their Islamic heritage, legislation remained drawn from the Holy
Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Mohammed, or Islamic Sharia (Eldem, 2013).
Influenced by modernity, the Kanun, or state “law,” introduced an amalgamation of the
Napoleonic Code, Roman law, and Islamic Sharia into Egypt’s legal systems, which
brought about the idea of a constitution separate from Sharia laws (“Legal Research
Guide: Egypt,” 2015).
It was not until the 1923 constitution that law recognized Egypt’s Islamic identity
(Gasper, 2009; Ghali, n.d.). After the 1952 military revolt, in 1956, a new constitution
was announced calling for the formation of a National Assembly, and was changed twice,
with the formation and secession of the Egyptian-Syrian merger. When president Anwar
Sadat took office, he adopted the constitution of 1971, which included Article II,
establishing the principles of Sharia as the source of legislation. In the years to follow,
Egyptians would come to be ever more discontent with the constitutional reign of Hosni
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Mubarak, and in the 2000s, the president, the Muslim Brotherhood, and revolutionaries
argued for multiple needed changes to the constitution. As a result, Mubarak requested
parliament to amend Article LXXVI (76), which defines how the president of Egypt is
elected, allowing for a multiparty election in 2005 (Cook, 2011).
Following Mubarak’s resignation, the military proposed a new 2011 provisional
constitution that paved the way for the 2011 parliamentary elections and the 2012
presidential election. The provisional constitution included the 4-year term and two-term
service limitations for the elected president, replacing the 6-year indefinite term article in
the pre-revolt version, and tasked the newly elected parliament with forming a new 100member constitutional drafting committee to write a permanent constitution for Egypt
(“Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes,” 2011).
In November 2012, the assembly approved a draft constitution, which Muslim
Brotherhood president-elect Mohamed Morsi signed into law (“Egyptian Constitution
‘Approved’ in Referendum,” 2012). After Morsi’s ouster, the 2012 constitution was
suspended and eventually replaced with the 2014 constitution. Under that constitution is a
guarantee of equality between the sexes, absolute freedom of belief, and an
acknowledgment of Islam as the state religion. It also included the 4-year term and twoterm service limitations for the elected president. Yet some argued that it bequeathed
more power to the military than the 2011 revolutionaries had hoped for (International
IDEA, 2016; “Official Vote Result,” 2014; “The 2014 Egyptian Constitution,” 2014).
The key learning from this overview is that the Egyptian constitution underwent
multiple stages of modification. These modifications were marked by the scuffle between
religious and secular laws, as in the many examples of including or excluding sharia law
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and Egypt’s Islamic identity. During the 2011-2014 period, Egyptian political structure
comprised of an executive (president’s cabinet), a legislative (upper and lower house of
parliament), and a judiciary (the district and supreme courts). Indeed, the tug of war
between all these branches, along with the military, was a hallmark of the events between
2011 and 2014, which are accounted for below.
Major Events between 2011-2014
Beginning in January 2011, Egyptians held a revolt against military president
Hosni Mubarak, who stepped down in February 2011 and turned his power over to the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). SCAF then dissolved the parliament,
suspended the constitution (Associated Press, 2013), and drew up a 6-month rebirth plan
of all government branches. It also planned for an amended provisional constitution that
would set the stage for the subsequent parliamentary and presidential elections, and
vowed to relinquish power to the elected government (Childress, 2013).
Yet, a controversy caught traction when some of Egypt’s Coptic Christian
intelligentsias and other political leaders suggested modifications to Article II of the
constitution to include statements representing Christians in relation to their public affairs,
or the article’s deletion (Ding, 2011). The comments stirred arguments among the
Islamists, who supported Article II, and the opposing democrats and seculars. SCAF, who
were in favor of Article II, announced a provisional constitution in March 2011 that
included Article II, and supporters of the Article cast an overpowering approval ballot
securing its inclusion (Associated Press, 2013). This transitory constitution also tasked
the upper and lower houses of parliament to elect a 100-member commission to draft a
new constitution (Childress, 2013).
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Later, parliamentary elections between November 2011 and February 2012
resulted in Islamists dominating 75% of the lower house and 90% of the upper house
(Mostly Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafists), which eventually led to an Islamicaly
dominated constitutional assembly (Associated Press, 2013; Childress, 2013). Democrats
and seculars disputed the Islamist dominance in both chambers, triggering the judiciaries
to place both chambers under review for probable disbandment. Nevertheless, with
parliamentary and constitutional matters on the move, SCAF instigated the presidential
election process between March 2012 and June 2012. Muslim Brotherhood candidate
Mohamed Morsi and the last military prime minister under Mubarak Ahmed Shafiq
emerged as front-runners. Shafiq’s presence in the race stirred a united outrage on the
Islamic and democratic fronts, prompting another intervention from the Supreme Courts.
Two days before the presidential elections, in June 2012, the court ruled for the armybacked candidate to stay in the race, and for the dissolution of the lower house of
parliament, angering both the Islamic and the democratic narratives. It also awarded
SCAF control over the national budget and the power to issue laws, diluting the power of
the forthcoming president (Childress, 2013).
Days later, Morsi won the presidential seat with 51.7% of the vote, becoming the
first civilian president of Egypt. In August 2012, he ordered the retirement of the top
Mubarak-era headship of the military and selected General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi as his
defense minister (Associated Press, 2013; Childress, 2013). In November 2012, members
of the democratic and secular parties withdrew from the 100-member assembly,
protesting against the lack of skill sets needed to draft a constitution, and against the
attempts by Islamists to enforce their will (Associated Press, 2013). Later that month,
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Morsi broadcasted a constitutional statement granting him the power to rule exclusively
without the right of other branches of government to veto (Childress, 2013). Furthermore,
it granted him the right to use all required measures to defy threats against the January 25
revolution, specifying that no authority could dissolve the existing upper house of
parliament or the constituent assembly (Sabry, 2012). Outraged, democrats and seculars
formed an alliance, termed The National Rescue Front (NRF), to resist Morsi’s
declaration (Kortam, 2012).
In that same month, the constituent assembly finalized the constitutional draft,
which Morsi approved and set its referendum for December 15, 2012 (Childress, 2013).
Thousands of liberal and secular protestors marched to the presidential palace on
December 4, 2012 demanding the cancellation of the referendum and a new
constitutional draft, claiming that Islamists subjugated the current constitution language.
On the same accord, the NRF demanded the annulment of Morsi’s power sweeping
decree, the withdrawal of the current constitutional draft, the postponement of the
referendum, and the formation of a new constituent assembly. Morsi annulled the decree
granting him unlimited power on December 8, 2012, yet rejected all other NRF demands,
proclaiming that if the constitution did not pass, the public would revote 100 new
members to write a new one, and then he asked the NRF to dialogue. The NRF rejected
his dialoging offer and moved to sponsor weeks of demonstration after the draft passed
the referendum with a 64% “yes” vote by a turnout of 32.9% of Egypt’s 52 million
eligible voters. Morsi signed it into law on December 26, 2012 to replace the 2011
provisional constitution (Associated Press, 2012b).
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Consequently, graffiti promoting “No” for the constitution of the Brotherhood
juxtaposed “Islamic state” slogans by Brotherhood supporters’ in the streets of Cairo. In
January 2013, the NRF announced its decision to boycott the parliamentary elections
called for by Morsi, and in turn, Egypt’s courts canceled them (Kortam, 2013).
Between January 2013 and April 2013, thousands held protests against Morsi that
resulted in further tension between democratic and secular protestors and Brotherhood
enthusiasts. One episode was the attack on a cathedral of the Coptic Orthodox Church
during a funeral proceeding, which Pope Tawadros II blamed on Morsi’s futile protection.
The NRF then backed the launch of “Tamarod”, a youth group founded to collect
impeachment signatures and call for mass protests on June 30, 2013. Before that day,
Tamarod announced it collected more than 22 million impeachment signatures, and on
June 30, 2013, millions of protesters demonstrated, accusing the Brotherhood of
hijacking Egypt’s revolution and imposing Islamic law. Hundreds sailed through the Nile
chanting against Morsi, while thousands backing Morsi congregated in Rabaa Square
chanting Islamic sentiments. Clashes around the MB headquarters resulted in its raiding
and eight deaths (Childress, 2013).
Tamarod offered Morsi until July 2 to resign, and Al-Sisi, as Defense minister,
threatened to intervene if the dispute was not resolved by July 3 (Childress, 2013). As the
deadline loomed, multiple government officials resigned, leaving the government with
only members of the FJP (Al-Youm, 2013a). On July 3, 2013, Morsi rejected Al-Sisi’s
48-hour ultimatum, resulting in his arrest and placement under military custody. AlAhram newspaper reported, “The Egyptian police had been ordered to arrest more than
300 members of the Brotherhood and issued travel bans on all its members” (Spencer,
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2013). Immediately, the Chief justice was appointed as interim president, the upper house
was dissolved, and the constitution was suspended (“Egypt Crisis,” 2013).
The Brotherhood termed the happening as a “military coup,” and some Islamists
threatened armed retaliation (Wedeman, Sayah, & Carter, 2013), yet some Salafists and
most Sufis sided with the military’s decision to remove Morsi from his position. Between
July 2013, and August 2013, supporters and challengers clashed at multiple venues.
Brotherhood supporters protesting where witnessed by BBC news reporter Jeremy
Bowen being fired at with live ammunition, resulting in 51 killings and 435 injuries
(“Egypt Unrest,” 2013). The army clashed again with Brotherhood protesters at the
Republican Guard compound, claiming that terrorists tried to storm it, resulting in more
than 300 tragedies that a Brotherhood member described as a “massacre” during dawn
prayers (Dziadosz & Nasralla, 2013) (“Massacre in Cairo Deepens Egypt Crisis,” 2013).
At the same time, Morsi supporters forced two soldiers to make pro-Morsi statements
while filming them being beaten (AFP, 2013).
The divide made Egypt’s Christian minority a target; churches across Egypt
canceled their evening social activities. Two days after the ousting, mobs rampaged
through a Christian village, burning dozens of homes, ransacking stores, and stabbing
four people to death. In a coastal city, masked gunmen opened fire at a local church and
killed a Coptic pastor in an outdoor market (Childress, 2013; Hendawi, 2013). On August
14, 2013, the violence would come to rise steeply when Egyptian security forces raided
two pro-Morsi camps in Cairo: one at al-Nahda Square and a larger one at Rabaa alAdawiya Mosque. The camps were plundered and cleared in hours after attempts to end
the six-week sit-ins failed. Tents and bodies were on fire, and the main mosque of Rabaa
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Al-Adawiya was burned with hundreds of unidentified bodies inside. According to the
Egyptian Health Ministry, 638 people were killed, of which 595 were civilians and 43
were police officers, with at least 3,994 injured. The incident and its aftermath make the
sum of fatalities the highest since the 2011 revolution that toppled Mubarak (Childress,
2013; “Death Toll from Egypt Violence Rises to 638,” 2013; Mohsen, 2013).
Violent retaliations followed in several cities across the country, extending to
September 2013 when Egypt’s minister of the interior survived a suicide car bomb
(Childress, 2013). In that same month, the courts banned the Muslim Brotherhood from
all political activity, and in November 2013, sanctioned all forms of public protest
without court permission. In December 2013, following a police station bombing, the
Muslim Brotherhood was declared a terrorist organization. In January 2014, Egypt voted
on a new constitution drafted by the interim government that passed with 98% of the vote,
with 40% of Egypt’s voting population partaking. In June 2014, protests would come to
fade as Egypt elected its fifth president, former military general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
(“The Egyptian Revolution,” n.d.).
The Analysis
Coming to my first claim, the analysis of the communications between the three
master-narratives reveals that they are competing to accomplish two main goals through
the constitutional battle. One, each narrative is attempting to normalize their views on
statehood as desired and accepted by all members of Egyptian society; and two, each
narrative is attempting to polarize the other narratives’ views on statehood up to the point
of demonization to justify violently eradicating them. The three master-narratives
accomplish both these goals by utilizing a variety of discursive strategies (see Chapter 3)
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to communicate their views on constitutional amendments, parliamentary elections,
constitution assembly members, and presidential elections. In the following, I will shed
light on examples of these discursive strategies in three main areas, each masternarrative’s aspirations for statehood, each master-narratives criticism for the other
narratives’ aspirations and polarizing attempts, and each master-narrative’s demonization
and violence validation.
Aspirations for Statehood
On the democratic master-narrative side, after Mubarak’s ousting, liberal college
professor and political activist Amr Hamzawy (2011a) said:
I have attempted to intensify discussion on a range of issues: whether a
presidential or a parliamentary regime is more preferable for a democratic Egypt;
amending the current constitution versus drafting a new one; the role of the
military in the transitional stage and afterward; how to institutionally manage an
expanded national dialogue about the transitional and democratic stage.…All
these issues are more central and important to Egypt’s democratic transformation
than the discussion of the identities of possible candidates.…My bias here…is in
favor of a parliamentary republic that guarantees developed political life and
limits the encroachment of the presidency and executive authority. I prefer this to
a presidential republic that gives the president absolute power with no
accountability. I believe strongly in the necessity of a new Egyptian constitution
that establishes parliamentarianism and saves us from the flawed 1971
constitution.…I also think it preferable that, after the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces hands over rule to an elected parliament and president, the role of
the military in political life be retained…to guarantee that there will be no coup
against democracy and pluralism…one must take note of the respected stance of
Mohammad ElBaradei, who refused to talk personally about his potential
candidacy and continually stressed the importance of achieving constitutional,
political, and institutional reform before thinking about the identity of presidential
candidates. He then announced that he would not run for the presidency, affirming
that what concerned him was Egypt’s democratic transformation. (paras. 7–10)
In this communication, Hamzawy demonstrates the mainstream aspiration for
statehood advocated by the democratic narrative by saluting ElBaradei’s support of
Egypt’s democratic makeover. He clearly voices opinions on statehood when he
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advocates for “parliamentarianism,” a liberal democratic governing structure. He also
voices opinions about the previous constitution and regime (the secular master-narrative)
when he says, “Absolute power with no accountability,” and subtly warns, using the
topos of threat, which states that if there are specific dangers one should act against them
(Wodak & Boukala, 2015), from the possibility of other non-democratic groups, namely
the military, hijacking the revolution. This warning manifests in the phrases “the role of
the military in political life be retained…” and “coup against democracy.” In furthering
the democratic narrative’s position on statehood, he said the following in response to the
provisional constitution that was finalized by SCAF in 2011:
The amendment to Egypt’s constitution recently announced by Chancellor Tareq
Bishri’s commission—if adopted by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
and approved by a majority of citizens in a general referendum—will lay the
foundation for constraining the near-absolute powers granted to the president by
the 1971 constitution.…Despite these proposed amendments, the 1971
constitution supports an authoritarian system of government that gives too much
control to the president, violates the powers of the legislative and judicial
branches, and suspends citizens’ liberties and rights. It is therefore unsuitable for
managing a safe transition to democracy, which requires a parliamentary
constitution and balanced powers among all three branches of government—along
with strong mechanisms of inter-branch oversight and accountability. Amending
the current constitution is not enough, but these proposed amendments help
ensure that a new constitution will be written for a free democratic Egypt after the
legislative elections. (Hamzawy, 2011b, paras. 1, 10, 11)
Here Hamzawy again criticizes the 1971 constitution and stresses the importance of the
new constitution’s correlation with a democratic Egypt. His statements demonstrate his
deep knowledge of political systems and passion for democratic structures both funded
by his education, occupation, and activism (see profiles). His warnings in this
communication clarify a predisposed loathing and skepticism amid the democratic
master-narrative toward the secular master-narrative.
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On the Islamic master-narrative side, aspirations for statehood for the three subnarratives were evident when they collectively condemned any alterations to Article II of
the constitution. The Salafists hurled a massive campaign to collect signatures, stressing
the need to hold on to the article, and then promoted the campaign on Facebook (at
www.facebook.com/IslamicId). The campaign coordinator described it as a “pre-emptive
move designed to emphasize the Islamic identity of Egypt and insure it will not be
touched [tampered with] and as pre-empt calls for the suppression of any campaigns
attempted to remove it from the new constitution” (Mourad, 2011, para. 7, translated
from Arabic1). The Salafists’ concerns however mainly related to how Islam is practiced
in Egypt, and thus theorize that an Islamic Identity verses a secular identity would insure
the proper mechanisms for Islamic practice. For example, many Salafists echoed a similar
sentiment to the content of a popular flier distributed in Cairo by a group named the
Egyptian Revolution Society. The flier read:
The problem is that our country will be without a religion…This means that the
call to the prayer will not be heard anymore like in the case of Switzerland,
women will be banned from wearing the hijab like in the case of France…And
there will be laws that allow men to get married to men and women to get married
to women like in the case of America. (Slackman, 2011, paras. 17).
On the Sufi side, as summarized in the “Post-Mubarak Era Public Debates” article,
the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayeb, announced his rejection of all
alternations to the article, describing it as an “established principle for the state” (“PostMubarak Era Public Debates,” n.d., para. 2). Al-Tayeb added that changing it may
“provoke sedition” (“Post-Mubarak Era Public Debates,” n.d., para. 2), establishing that
“Article II is one of the pillars of the state and nation, and that talk of changing the article
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	"ﺧﻁطﻭوﺓة ﺍاﺳﺗﺑﺎﻗﻳﯾﺔ ﺗﻬﮭﺩدﻑف ﺍاﻟﻰ ﺍاﻟﺗﺄﻛﻳﯾﺩد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﮬﮪھﻭوﻳﯾﺔ ﻣﺻﺭر ﺍاﻻﺳﻼﻣﻳﯾﺔ ﻭوﻋﺩدﻡم ﺍاﻟﻣﺳﺎﺱس ﺑﻬﮭﺎ ﻭوﺍاﺟﻬﮭﺎﺽض ﺍاﻟﺩدﻋﻭوﺍاﺕت ﻻﻟﻐﺎﺋﻬﮭﺎ ﻣﻥن ﺃأﻱي ﺩدﺳﺗﻭوﺭر ﺟﺩدﻳﯾﺩد 
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raises sectarian tensions, and sectarian tensions are threatening to freedom and
democracy” (“Post-Mubarak Era Public Debates,” n.d., para. 2). He also said that any
alterations would disturb Egypt’s Islamic identity but further made it a point to explain
that he was not denoting the “theocratic religious sense of an Islamic identity” (“Azhar
Grand Sheikh Again Rejects,” 2013, para. 5). This means that while al-Tayeb values
Egypt’s Islamic identity in principle, his concerns relate less to practice and more to
stability and security.
On the far end of the Islamic narrative, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), who
strategically sided with protestors to annul religious attributions to the revolution, clearly
represented the main opposition to the other two master-narratives. During the 2011
protests for example, Mohamed Morsi said, “We are not pushing this movement, but we
are moving with it. We don’t wish to lead it but we want to be part of it” (Yassin-Kassab,
2011, para. 1). The MB advised against any alternations to Article II, and their approval
for the provisional constitution of 2011 that included the Article was mentioned in the
following:
The group supports the amendments approved by the committee, which is headed
by Judge Tariq human. He [Mohammed Morsi] calls on to the nation to approve
them, as a ‘first step towards the path’ and ‘closest to the right path.’ He
[Mohammed Morsi] adds that although it ‘is not sufficient to satisfy the demands
of the revolution and the revolutionaries, but that the country is at a critical stage
that requires it to get out of the bottleneck through those amendments that leads us
to a state of stability.’ (Sarhan, 2011, translated from Arabic2)
Yet, even though the group’s initial stand shed away from a direct unveiling of
their aspirations for statehood, members of the Brotherhood were notorious for their
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  "  ﻭوﺇإﻥن ﻛﺎﻧﺕت،٬ ﻣﺿﻳﯾﻔﺎ ﺃأﻧﻬﮭﺎ،٬" "ﺧﻁطﻭوﺓة ﺃأﻭوﻟﻰ ﻧﺣﻭو ﺍاﻟﻣﺳﺎﺭر" ﻭو"ﺍاﻷﻗﺭرﺏب ﺇإﻟﻰ ﺍاﻟﻁطﺭرﻳﯾﻕق ﺍاﻟﺻﺣﻳﯾﺢ،٬"ﺍاﻟﺟﻣﺎﻋﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺍاﻟﺗﻌﺩدﻳﯾﻼﺕت ﺍاﻟﺗﻲ ﺃأﻗﺭرﱠﺗﻬﮭﺎ ﺍاﻟﻠﺟﻧﺔ ﺍاﻟﻣﺷﻛﻠﺔ ﺑﺭرﺋﺎﺳﺔ ﺍاﻟﻣﺳﺗﺷﺎﺭر ﻁطﺎﺭرﻕق ﺍاﻟﺑﺷﺭرﻱي
ﻁطﺗﺗﱠﺏب ﺍاﻟﺧﺭرﻭوﺝج ﻣﻥن ﻋﻧﻕق ﺍاﻟﺯزﺟﺎﺟﺔ ﻣﻥن ﺧﻼﻝل ﺗﻠﻙك ﺍاﻟﺗﻌﺩدﻳﯾﻼﺕت ﺍاﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻧﻘﻠﻧﺎ ﺇإﻟﻰ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺍاﻻﺳﺗﻘﺭرﺍاﺭر
 ﻠ،٬ﺟَﺔ
ِ ﺇإﻻ ﺃأﻥن ﺍاﻟﺑﻼﺩد ﺭرﱡﺗﻣ ﺑﻣﺭرﺣﻠﺔ ﺣ َﺭر،٬ﻟﺛﻭوﺍاﻭوﱠﺍاﺭر
""ﻏﻳﯾﺭر ﻛﺎﻓﻳﯾﺔ ﻹﺭرﺿﺎء ﻣﻁطﺎﻟﺏب ﺍاﻟﺛﻭوﺭرﺓة.	
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Islamist political ambitions for many years. Most recent to the 2011 revolution was via
their 2004 political platform mentioned by liberal Magdy Khalil (2006) in the following:
The Muslim Brotherhood issued a March 2004 political platform, which was in
fact a proposal for an Islamist state. According to this initiative: “Our mission is
to implement a comprehensive reform in order to uphold God’s law in secular as
well as religious matters.…Our only hope, if we wish to achieve any type of
progress, is to adhere to our religion, as we used to, and to apply the Shari’a
(Islamic law).” It states that the Brotherhood’s “mission is to build a Muslim
individual, a Muslim family and an Islamic rule to lead other Islamic states.” How
would this Islamic identity affect the media, economy, politics, education, social
welfare, women’s issues, and culture? The Muslim Brotherhood elaborates on
these issues in its initiative: “The Media should be cleansed of anything that
disagrees with the decrees of Islam.” “We believe in an economic system that is
derived from Islam.”…“The focus of education should be on learning the Quran
by heart.”…“Women should only hold the kind of posts that would preserve their
virtue.” …“There should be a ban on improper and offensive series and television
programs.” (para. 14)
More clues for the Brotherhood’s desire for statehood were apparent when they
contradicted their initial stance on not leading the revolution by entering the race for
parliamentary and presidential elections. Additionally, while their initial campaign did
not include religious slogans (“Brotherhood begins campaigning without religious
slogan”, 2011), dominant Brotherhood 2012 constitutional assembly members integrated
certain Islamicaly inspired theological language in their 2012 draft that was not part of
any constitution in Egypt’s history, a draft that was later approved by MB Egyptian
president at the time, Mohamed Morsi. This may have hinted to the other master
narratives that the group intended on embedding a form of collective practice that would
affirm Egypt’s Islamic identity through supplementary regulations that are confirmative
with Sharia. The same reference for an Islamic Egyptian identity was carried forward by
Brotherhood supporters during Morsi’s ouster in 2013 as they cheered, “Morsi is our
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President!” and “Egypt is Islamic” (Behn, 2013). With that, we can safely assume that the
MB’s aspiration for statehood is Islamic in principle.
For the secular master-narrative, the approval of Article II in the 2011 provisional
constitution by the chair of the SCAF-appointed provisional constitutional committee
raised debates. Seculars’ support for an amendment of the article was summarized in the
“Post-Mubarak Era Public Debates” report. Michael Mounir, president of the U.S. Copts
Association, alleged that the article was prejudiced, while Coptic executive Naguib
Sawiris condemned Article II for “institutionalizing sectarianism” (“Post-Mubarak Era
Public Debates,” n.d., para. 4). In addition, Ahmed Sobhy Mansour, the leading capitalist
figure who promotes a secular state for Egypt, pushed for an amendment of the article,
reaping severe reproaches from mainstream Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood scholars
(“Post-Mubarak Era Public Debates,” n.d.).
Years before the 2011 revolution, Coptic Pope Shenouda III of the Coptic
Orthodox Church of Alexandria dismissed the official representative of the church, Anba
Morqos, for having suggested the abolition of Article II, and advised Copts not to
demand its removal. Again, in March of 2011, Pope Shenouda reiterated his position to
avoid sectarian tension:
I believe that at the current stage, it is difficult to oppose this article, especially for
Christians. As a compromise, I suggest the following, if it is essential to keep it,
we may add a sentence “as for non-Muslims, the commandments of their religion
shall apply in personal statute and clergy matters.” (“Post-Mubarak Era Public
Debates,” n.d., para. 2)
Morqos’s suggestion to abolish Article II reflects the Coptic’s displeasure with Egypt’s
Islamic identity and their fear of Egypt’s Islamization, while Shenouda’s compromising
suggestion reflects the varying approaches amid the Coptic sub-narrative. The above
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communications highlight the focal aspiration for both the Coptic Christians and
Capitalists, which is a clear separation between church and state, without necessarily
limiting the military’s power in manifesting this goal.
As for the military’s view on statehood, it was no secret that they prioritized
national security through a pan-Arabism ideology since the revolt of 1952. Yet, they also
sided with the protestors and remained uninvolved up until they backed military
candidate Ahmed Shafiq in the 2012 presidential elections. Salem (2013) explains the
military’s initial position, saying:
It appears that the revolutionary protests succeeded in toppling Mubarak because
the military decided to “side with the revolution.” This was not necessarily out of
sympathy for the demands of the protesters, however, but because the military
made a strategic calculation. (para. 18)
Later in the discourse, we gain further understandings of the military’s position in
2013 during Morsi’s ouster. Excerpts from Al-Sisi’s speech at the graduation ceremony
for the Navy and Air Defense Academies exposes the military’s national concerns:
I said Egyptian national security is at risk amid internal political differences, to
which some were surprised…, I ask all honorable and faithful Egyptians to take to
the streets on Friday, to mandate me to confront terrorism and violence. I did not
ask of you anything before. I want you Egyptians to delegate the army and the
police to confront violence in a suitable way. Please bear the responsibility with
the army and the police. Show your steadfastness. This does not mean that I want
violence or terrorism. (Mesalhy, 2013)
Here Al-Sisi uses a combination of topoi (Plural of topos) (Wodak & Boukala,
2015), the topos of threat and the topos of national responsibility, which states that when
national security is at risk one is obligated to respond. He uses both topoi in order to
mobilize action towards what he branded in his communication, using referential
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discursive strategies and the topos of definition (which hints that by definition certain
things are treated in certain manners), as terrorism.
Al-Sisi also said, “He is wrong whoever believes that we will be silent against any
upcoming harm, and I hope they realize and we all realize the danger of that on national
security” (Mesalhy, 2013). He also clarified saying:
The army’s decision to intervene [on July 3 2013] was dictated by national
interest, national security necessities, and fears of a civil war breaking out…if the
situation continued.…We believed that if we reached civil war, then the army
would not be able to stop it. (Al-Youm, 2013b; Mesalhy, 2013)3
Here al-Sisi focuses on national security as the central motivator for necessary
involvement. He uses the topos of threat to warn that the possibility of civil war poses a
threat to national security, thus creating a situation that requires the intervention of the
armed forces. He also employs the topos of definition by equating Morsi’s regime with
terrorism; this aids in the creation of a worldwide-understood threat that requires local
and international support. His communication as a whole also employs the topos of
burden, which argues that if a person, an institution, or a country is burdened by specific
problems, one should act in order to diminish those burdens” (Wodak & Boukala, 2015,
p.97).
During his army resignation speech, when he announced his run for presidency,
Al-Sisi continued to refer to state security and national defense as current priorities,
saying:
Great people of Egypt Today, I stand before you in my military uniform for the
last time after I have decided to end my service as the Minister of Defense….I
have spent my entire life as a soldier in the service of the nation and in the service
of its hopes and aspirations and I will continue to do so God willing. And I will
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For a similar statement about the risk of unstoppable civil war, see his remarks on August 18, 2013, at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LC93fn9s3-c.
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always be proud of wearing the uniform in defense of the nation and today I leave
this uniform in order to defend the nation. Therefore, I am here before you
humbly stating my intention to run for the presidency of the Arab Republic of
Egypt….Only your support will grant me this great honor. I appear before you to
speak from the heart…to say to you that I am representing the appeals a wide
spectrum of the Egyptian people demanding that I run for this honorable office.
(Egyptsource, 2014)
Al-Sisi again uses the topos of national responsibility to explain the necessity for

his resignation from the army with the presidential campaign statement “I leave this
uniform in order to defend the nation.” He further uses the topos of national
responsibility when he claims that the majority of the Egyptian people are “demanding”
that he run for office, and thus, because of national responsibility, he must do so. This
also shows his attempt to normalize the collective mainstream view as one in need of a
national security protector.
This concludes that the aspirations for statehood on the democratic masternarrative’s side were largely democratic, with a parliamentary system that limits the
military’s power and religious influences. It also shows that the Islamic master-narratives
aspirations were largely Islamic in nature, yet for various reasons. For the Brotherhood, it
related to insuring the establishment of an Islamic state, for the Salafists, it related to the
protection of Islam as a practice in Egyptian society through an Islamic national Identity,
and for the Sufis, it related to national stability and order. Finally, the above sheds light
on the secular-master narrative militant and secular version of statehood, with a strong
separation between religion and state agenda, and an over powered military to insure its
application.
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Polarization: In-Groups and Out-Groups
From the above, it is clear that Mubarak’s removal charted an opportunity to redefine the Egyptian state. The nationalistic degrees of each master-narrative, and subnarrative or individual within that master-narrative, determined how inclusive or
exclusive they were in their definition. Hardcore nationalists, who view their group as
majestic, became far more exclusive and regarded the diversity as problematic (Kriesberg,
2003; Anastasiou, 2008). This exclusive attribution of a single ideology to the state,
fueled by the nationalistic view of homogeny, was especially problematic within the
ideologically diverse Egypt. This is because it causes identity groups outside of the
ideological definition to become the outcast (Anastasiou, 2008; Dingley, 2011), and as
such, in the case of Egypt, it triggered intergroup conflict amid the three masternarratives that heightened during the referendum of 2012.
On the Islamist side, the Brotherhood portrayed the approval of the 2012
constitution as a majority consensus. Their celebratory comments ignored the opposing
views and allegations from democrats and seculars, along with the low turnout of eligible
voters (Linton, 2012). Their rhetoric only aimed to normalize the approval as desired by
most of the Egyptian population. Sensing the tensions, Morsi, after signing the
constitution into law, attempted to win over the opposing democrats and seculars saying:
We don’t want to return to an era of one opinion, fakeness, and manufactured
majorities. The maturity and consciousness [of voters] heralds that Egypt has set
on a path of democracy with no return.…Regardless of the results, for the sake of
building the nation, efforts must unite. There is no alternative to a dialogue that is
now a necessity. (Beaumont, 2012, paras. 8–9)
In this message, Morsi uses the topos of definition to define the previous regime
as single opinioned, fake, and a manufacturer of an unrealistic majority. Then, he
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juxtaposes that undesirable definition against the desirable “path of democracy,” which,
in his view, his presidency has accomplished. FJP’s media advisor commented on the
majority “yes” vote for the 2012 referendum, saying, “We hope approving the new
constitution would be a historic opportunity to reunite national forces, on the basis of
mutual respect and sincere dialogue, in order to achieve stability in this homeland and to
complete its constitutional institutions” (Hussein, 2012, para. 3). Acting as minister of
defense and also sensing the tensions, Al-Sisi then said, “Anything other than that
[dialogue] will force us into a dark tunnel with disastrous consequences” (Associated
Press, 2012a).
Yet, the divides where eminent, as one activist said:
The divides and polarization are here to stay…The sectarian rhetoric of the “yes”
campaign…by Brotherhood leaders will have long-lasting ramifications…The
passage of the constitution is unlikely to usher in any semblance of stability, and
in fact might institutionalize the current political crisis. (Hussein, 2012, para. 18)
Another liberal figure said, “I see more unrest…People are not going to accept the way
he [Morsi] is dealing with the situation” (Hussein, 2012, para. 19). Hamzawy said that
democrats would use “all peaceful, democratic means to challenge the constitution”
(Hussein, 2012, para. 14). Consequentially, rigidity became the first step in deepening the
polarization. In response to Morsi’s request to dialogue and call for parliamentary
elections in 2013, the NRF was reported by Aljazeera news saying the following, “The
decision of the front, unanimously, is to boycott the elections…We tell President Morsi:
talk with yourself and your party.” (paras. 2 & 10). On that note, Marina Ottaway, a
Middle East Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a longtime analyst of political
transformations in the Middle East, captured a sound prediction saying:
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It’s very paradoxical for an opposition that claims to defend democracy to be
rejecting elections at this point and the decree issued last November by Morsi was
certainly not democratic.…Neither party is acting democratic, so it seems that
they are moving toward a very heavy confrontation. (McTighe, 2013)
Yet, the polarization seed had been planted since the courts dissolved the
Islamicaly dominant lower house of parliament in 2012, to which Morsi responded
saying that some groups in Egypt plan “ill against the people” (Hearst & Hussein, 2012,
para. 10). Here Morsi uses the topos of threat to create a situation of conspiracy to foster
unity by implying that some groups (out-group) plan ill against the people (in-group). In
that sense, Morsi’s absolutist power decree could easily be viewed as a response to the
courts’ verdict, a “tit for tat” conflict strategy, since the Brotherhood feared that the
courts would rule similarly against the Islamicaly dominant upper house and
constitutional assembly. Nevertheless, the fact that the Brotherhood raced for all facets of
government after the Mubarak ousting contradicted their initial position, placed the
democratic and secular narratives, along with the courts, on the defense, because they
feared the Islamists would “hijack” the revolution.
Arguably, the predisposed suspicion on all ends may have been what set the tit for
tat dynamic in motion to begin with. For example, The Brotherhood’s fears heightened
after witnessing the democratic and secular narratives’ reactions to their dominance in
parliament and the constitutional assembly. Hamzawy for instance relayed the following
before Morsi announcing his decree of full power and the 2012 referendum:
Questions about the legality and constitutionality of the second Constituent
Assembly cloud its future.…The constitutionality of the Constituent Assembly is
currently under review by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which is expected to
make a decision by December 12 [2012]. This will likely mean the Constituent
Assembly will be disbanded unless President Morsi intervenes.…The Constituent
Assembly is dominated by Islamists and has marginalized many key groups and
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stakeholders in Egyptian society, including women, minorities, and members of
the labor movement among other groups.…Also, some liberal figures have
threatened to pull out of the Constituent Assembly; this contentious environment
is not conducive to drafting a constitution.…Furthermore, many assembly
members lack legal and constitutional expertise, resulting in several
contradictions and mistakes in the draft constitution. (Hamzawy & Fakir, 2012)
In this message, Hamzawy objects to the Islamic dominance in the assembly,
attributing it covertly to diversity issues and the illegality of parliamentary elections
rather than potential religious constitutional language imposed by the Islamic dominance.
Hence, he uses Wodak and Boukala’s (2015) predicational strategies to attribute negative
characteristics to the many members of the assembly, such as their “lack of legal and
constitutional expertise” (Hamzawy & Fakir, 2012). These comments conflict with his
democratic viewpoint, as advocates of democratic systems accept democratically elected
assemblies, regardless of their composition. The comments are clearly hints to the
Islamist dominance, which in turn cause an apprehension on the MB side.
Ottaway (2012) commented on the true root of this anxiety saying:
They [seculars, liberals, and activists] are demanding that the Constituent
Assembly be composed primarily of representatives of organizations outside the
parliament—such as religious institutions [Al-Azhar], universities, and
professional syndicates—which in their view represent the Egyptian people better
than the elected parliament. Allowing the parliament to elect the Constituent
Assembly as it sees fit, many argue, would allow Islamists to dominate the
writing of the constitution. (para. 2)
The distress with the Islamists dominance was ever more evident in Hamzawy’s
speech after the draft was completed:
Criticism facing the constitutional project relating to personal, civic political
freedoms and others. Concerning these rights and freedoms there are loose
wording used in the first section: the state and the community section, and are
used as well in the second section: the rights and freedoms and public duties
section…wording that refers to “ethical fundamentals,” \ “inherent [social]
customs, ” “inherent character” and the “ethical duties towards the state and the
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community”.…The article 81 discusses my personal freedoms as a citizen, and
each citizen’s personal freedom…that each citizen exercises those rights within
the scope of the fundamentals mentioned in the state and community section,
what is mentioned in the state and community section? Loose wording that can be
used to restrict my rights by a series of laws that might open doors wide for Egypt
to restrict rights and freedoms [allowing] the state to intervene in our personal
lives and our personal freedoms even in our community, which is undefined in
this constitution. This opens the door for groups we would rather not have in
Egypt; ones that we can metaphorically refer to as “the promotion of virtue and
prohibiting of vice groups.4” (DrAmrHamzawyOfficial, 2012; translated from
Arabic)
In this communication, Hamzawy employs the topos of threat by suggesting the
metaphorical consequence of a presumed danger from the presence of the promotion of
virtue and prohibiting of vice groups (PVPV) in Egypt if Morsi’s constitutional draft was
approved. His opposition toward such groups is highlighted when he says “groups that
we would rather not have,” which creates assumptions that, one, these groups are
unwelcomed and, two, all Egyptians would rather not have them, or ought not to want
them. Thus, using the topos of threat, he blames the formulation of such groups on the
constitutional draft to mobilize a “no” vote during the constitutional referendum. This
discursive strategy created a sense of in-group, individuals who reject the PVPV, and an
out-group, individuals who supported the PVPV.
Liberal Mona Makram-Ebeid also communicated a parallel sentiment, saying,
“Women, Christians, intellectuals, all these were sidelined in the new constitution. They
would say, ‘you can have liberty of expression, freedom, etc.—if it is in conformity with
Sharia’” (Childress, 2013, “Nov. 29: Islamists Finish Draft Constitution”). During
Morsi’s ousting in 2013, one revolutionary said, “He is a president for the
Brotherhood…He didn’t respect the judiciary, the people or the constitution…He wants
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to turn the country into a Brotherhood nation” (Abdellatif, 2013, paras. 13–14). The
discursive formation of the out-group is drawn upon by use of topoi that affirm negative
attributions, and warnings, that placed the Brotherhood on the defense. This rhetoric
schooled accusation and unrelated blame on the grassroots levels of all the masternarratives. For example, during the water crisis triggered by the Ethiopian dam
construction project, a local shopkeeper said, “They [the Brotherhood] wanted an Islamic
caliphate. They didn’t care about Egypt as a country, so they did nothing to stop this
[Ethiopian] dam” (Orsam Water Research Programme, 2013, p. 22).
On the secular side, military supporter journalist Mustafa Bakri criticized Morsi’s
constitution and his declaration to retain the power to legislate and not transmitted it to
the Shura council or any other branch of government saying:
This is an assault on the Constitution, which the president swore to protect…we
are facing a President of the individual, judging without supervision and without a
constitution and can issue any laws that uphold the rule of his group and his party,
and that tax his opponents…it is enough that he granted himself the right to form
a Constituent Assembly if the verdict of the judiciary is invalidates it, which
means the issuing of a Constitution against everyone’s will. Was this what the
revolution was for? We have returned to sole ruling quickly and fiercely and with
disregard for the Constitution and laws. (“Bakri: Morsi governs without
censorship or constitution,” 2012. translated from Arabic5)
Bakri uses topos of definition to define Morsi’s regime as dictating (“President of the
individual, judging without supervision”). The discursive strategy employed aids in the
creation of an out-group (“his group and his party”) and an in-group (“his opponents”),
also indicating competition on constitutional matters. He uses the Aristotelian fallacious
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 ‘ﻟﻘﺪ ﺃأﺻﺒﺤﻨﺎ ﺃأﻣﺎﻡم ﺭرﺋﻴﯿﺲ:ﺇإﻥن ﺫذﻟﻚ ﻳﯾﻌﺪ ﺍاﻋﺘﺪﺍاء ﻋﻠﻲ ﺍاﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮﺭر ﺍاﻟﺬﻱي ﺃأﻗﺴﻢ ﺍاﻟﺮﺋﻴﯿﺲ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﯾﺘﻪﮫ ﻭوﻳﯾﻘﻀﻲ ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺒﺪﺃأ ﺍاﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﻴﯿﻦ ﺍاﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎﺕت ﻭوﻗﺎﻝل
 ﺃأﻱي ﺇإﻧﻨﺎ ﺃأﻣﺎﻡم ﺭرﺋﻴﯿﺲ ﻓﺮﺩد ﻳﯾﺤﻜﻢ ﺑﻼ ﺭرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ﻭوﺑﻼ ﺩدﺳﺘﻮﺭر ﻭوﻳﯾﺴﺘﻄﻴﯿﻊ ﺃأﻥن ﻳﯾﺼﺪﺭر ﺃأﻳﯾﺔ,ﻳﯾﻤﺴﻚ ﻟﻠﻤﺮﺓة ﺍاﻷﻭوﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﺬ ﻋﻘﻮﺩد ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻠﻄﺘﻴﯿﻦ ﺍاﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﯿﺬﻳﯾﺔ ﻭوﺍاﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﯾﻌﻴﯿﺔ
 ‘ﻳﯾﻜﻔﻲ ﺃأﻧﻪﮫ ﻣﻨﺢ ﻧﻔﺴﻪﮫ ﺣﻖ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﯿﻞ ﺍاﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻟﺘﺄﺳﻴﯿﺴﻴﯿﺔ ﺣﺎﻝل ﺻﺪﻭوﺭر ﺣﻜﻢ ﺑﺒﻄﻼﻧﻬﮭﺎ:ﻗﻮﺍاﻧﻴﯿﻦ ﺗﺪﻋﻢ ﺣﻜﻢ ﺟﻤﺎﻋﺘﻪﮫ ﻭوﺣﺰﺑﻪﮫ ﻭوﺗﻘﺼﻲ ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﺎﺭرﺿﻴﯿﻦ ﻭوﺃأﺿﺎﻑف
 ﺃأﻱي ﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﯾﻌﻨﻲ ﺇإﺻﺪﺍاﺭر ﺩدﺳﺘﻮﺭر ﻣﻼﻛﻲ ﺭرﻏﻢ ﺃأﻧﻒ ﺍاﻟﺠﻤﻴﯿﻊ ﻭوﺃأﻭوﺿﺢ ﺃأﻧﻪﮫ ﺑﺘﻤﺴﻚ ﺍاﻟﺮﺋﻴﯿﺲ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ ﺍاﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﯾﻌﻴﯿﺔ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺎﺩد ﺇإﻟﻴﯿﻨﺎ ﺣﻜﻢ ﺍاﻟﻔﺮﺩد ﺳﺮﻳﯾﻌﺎ,ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻘﻀﺎء
 
	 ﻭوﺑﺄﺷﺪ ﻗﺴﻮﺓة ﻭوﺍاﺳﺘﻬﮭﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮﺭر ﻭوﺍاﻟﻘﻮﺍاﻧﻴﯿﻦ 
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topos of aftermath to suggest that Morsi’s decree that granted him near absolute power
will result in him forcing a constitution. Bakri’s comments aim to brand Morsi as a
natural dictator, they fail to consider that the decree was a reaction on the Brotherhood’s
side when they feared the disbandment of the upper house of parliament by the courts; as
with the lower house. His comments also fall short from envisioning future possibilities
for negotiations and amendments; possibilities that can be built on hopeful scenarios
similar to when Morsi agreed to withdraw his exclusive power granting decree before the
referendum.
Secular figure Ahmed Mansour (2013) added to the constitutional criticism,
allegations, and polarization, saying:
Endowments on monasteries and other properties was an Egyptian phenomenon
when the Arabs conquered Egypt.…It is natural in a governance system that is
dominated by intolerance, injustice, and that uses religion as means of tyranny
and slavery for Copts to be treated with injustice. An example is permitting
endowments on Copts. We are not rooting in the field of research in this subject
so as not to stray away from the basis of the topic [Morsi’s constitution], but we
suffice with revealing examples that point to the Brotherhood…and Salafist’s
current mentalities.…The benefit from the foregoing is that the law in the Sunni
fanaticism can be easily applied by perjury.…This happened in the…“Salaf” era
[era of the predecessor of prophet Mohamed]. What prevents it being applied in
the era of Salafists?? From here we understand the presence of the endowment
article in the Constitution of Morsi. This article stands on the lookout for Copts.
(translated from Arabic6)
In this communication, Mansour draws a distinction between Arabs and Egyptians and
uses topos of definition to define Arab Egypt as intolerant and unjust. This
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 ﻭوﺟﺎء ﺗﻘﻠﻳﯾﺩدﻫﮬﮪھﻡم ﻟﻬﮭﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﺩدﺭرﻳﯾﺞ ﺧﻼﻝل ﺍاﻟﻌﺻﻭوﺭر ﺍاﻟﺗﺎﻟﻳﯾﺔ ﺍاﻟﻰ ﺃأﻥن،٬ ﻛﺎﻧﺕت ﺍاﻷﻭوﻗﺎﻑف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍاﻷﺩدﻳﯾﺭرﺓة ﻭوﻏﻳﯾﺭرﻫﮬﮪھﺎ ﻅظﺎﻫﮬﮪھﺭرﺓة ﻣﺻﺭرﻳﯾﺔ ﻋﻧﺩدﻣﺎ ﻓﺗﺢ ﺍاﻟﻌﺭرﺏب ﻣﺻﺭر
ﺃأﺻﺑﺣﺕت ﻟﻣﺻﺭر ﻣﻛﺎﻧﺗﻬﮭﺎ ﻭوﺭرﻳﯾﺎﺩدﺗﻬﮭﺎ ﻓﻰ ﺍاﻟﻌﺻﺭر ﺍاﻟﻔﺎﻁطﻣﻰ ﻓﺈﺯزﺩدﻫﮬﮪھﺭرﺕت ﺍاﻷﻭوﻗﺎﻑف ﻭوﺃأﺻﺑﺢ ﻟﻬﮭﺎ ﺩدﻭوﺭرﻫﮬﮪھﺎ ﺍاﻟﺳﻳﯾﺎﺳﻰ ﻭوﺍاﻟﺩدﻋﻭوﻯى ﺍاﻟﺫذﻯى ﺗﻐﻳﯾﺭر ﻣﻥن ﺍاﻟﻔﺎﻁطﻣﻳﯾﻳﯾﻥن ﺍاﻟﻰ
 ﻛﺎﻥن،٬  ﻭوﻣﻥن ﺍاﻟﻁطﺑﻳﯾﻌﻰ ﻓﻰ ﻧﻅظﻡم ﺣﻛﻡم ﻳﯾﺳﻭوﺩدﻫﮬﮪھﺎ ﺍاﻟﺗﻌﺻﺏب ﻭوﺍاﻟﻅظﻠﻡم ﻭوﺗﺳﺗﺧﺩدﻡم ﺍاﻟﺩدﻳﯾﻥن ﻓﻰ ﺍاﻻﺳﺗﺑﺩدﺍاﺩد ﻭوﺍاﻻﺳﺗﻌﺑﺎﺩد ﺃأﻥن ﻳﯾﻧﺎﻝل ﺍاﻷﻗﺑﺎﻁط ﻅظﻠﻡم. ﺍاﻷﻳﯾﻭوﺑﻳﯾﻳﯾﻥن ﻭوﺍاﻟﻣﻣﺎﻟﻳﯾﻙك
 ﻭوﻟﺳﻧﺎ ﻓﻰ ﻣﺟﺎﻝل ﺍاﻟﺗﺄﺻﻳﯾﻝل ﺍاﻟﺑﺣﺛﻰ ﻓﻰ ﻫﮬﮪھﺫذﺍا ﺍاﻟﻣﻭوﺿﻭوﻉع ﺣﺗﻰ ﻻ ﻧﺧﺭرﺝج ﻋﻥن ﺃأﺳﺎﺱس ﺍاﻟﻣﻭوﺿﻭوﻉع ﻭوﻫﮬﮪھﻭو ) ﺩدﺳﺗﻭوﺭر. ﻣﻧﻪﮫ ﺃأﺳﺗﺣﻼﻝل ﺃأﻭوﻗﺎﻑف ﺍاﻷﻗﺑﺎﻁط
 ﻭوﻟﻛﻥن ﻧﻛﺗﻔﻰ ﺑﺄﻣﺛﻠﺔ ﻛﺎﺷﻔﺔ ﺗﺷﻰ ﻭوﺗﺷﻳﯾﺭر ﺍاﻟﻰ ﺍاﻟﻌﻘﻠﻳﯾﺔ ﺍاﻟﺳﻠﻔﻳﯾﺔ ﺍاﻻﺧﻭوﺍاﻧﻳﯾﺔ ﺍاﻟﻭوﻫﮬﮪھﺎﺑﻳﯾﺔ ﺍاﻟﺣﺎﻟﻳﯾﺔ،٬ (  
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communication perhaps provides a clearer picture of the underlying reasons for the
competition on governing systems. Mansour clearly criticizes the Arab’s ruling system
when he says, “It is natural in a governance system that is dominated by
intolerance…that uses religion as means of tyranny and slavery…for Copts to be treated
with injustice.” He then makes the connection between Arabs’ governing methods and
the Brotherhood and Salafists’ mentalities, circuitously tagging them also as intolerant
and unjust. He uses the topos of threat when saying, “What prevents it being applied in
the era of Salafists??” adding, “This article stands on the lookout for Copts.”
In return, the Brotherhood also embraced rigidity when their position was
threatened. For example, in June 2013 when the military issued statements implying that
it would mobilize an intervention. Morsi’s presidency released the following statement:
The president of the republic was not consulted about the statement issued by the
armed forces.…The presidency confirms that it is going forward on its previously
plotted path to promote comprehensive national reconciliation…regardless of any
statements that deepen divisions between citizens. (Fayed & Taylor, 2013)
When Al-Sisi was meeting with a number of religious, national, political, and youth icons
and announced that there would be a statement issued regarding the intervention, the FJP
replied, “We do not go to invitations (meetings) with anyone. We have a president and
that is it” (Weaver & McCarthy, 2013).
Days before the ousting, Morsi addressed the nation in a speech, saying:
Egypt has been invaded many times throughout history, and its enemies came
between its people and its potential to be the state with the true message…That is
evident throughout imperialist history, and the several revolutions came after that,
with the last one, also the greatest one, the revolution of the 25th of January 2011.
When we all stood in all the squares to say to the criminal tyrant that he must
leave. (Mackell, 2013)
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Here Morsi uses the topos of definition to define historic imperial invasions as the enemy
of Egypt, and further defines Mubarak as a “criminal tyrant.” There is a discursive
construction of an in-group when he notes those who stood in all the squares and that of
an out-group when he references imperialist as enemies and tyrants as criminals—the
construction of eligible and ineligible national identities.
He then adds:
But as you know, there remained tails, claws, the vandals and many challenges
remained.…I see now, oh Egyptians, that this revolution is being stolen from us,
and that it is desired for us to be submerged in a sea of never ending conflicts.…I
put a direct order, to all the forces, in the institutions, interior security forces, and
the armed forces, that their role is the keeping of the security of the nation…that
they also protect the legitimacy, that we all earned as a result of the presidential
elections and before that the parliamentary elections and after that the
constitutional referendum. So those, who are the sons of this nation, are asked to
protect the legitimacy and to protect this nation, and that constitutional legitimacy
and legal legitimacy, and that the voice of the people, of this people that have
erected this legitimacy, would be the reason to protect this nation. (Mackell,
2013)
In this case, Morsi uses the topos of threat to elucidate that there is remanence of the
previous regime by saying “there remained tails, claws, the vandals,” then using the
conceptual metaphor “being submerged in a sea of never ending conflicts” as a means of
explaining the grave danger from such a threat. The threat is also used to mobilize action
and is further stretched using the topos of national responsibility, when he says, “I put a
direct order, to all the forces…that their role is the keeping of the security of the nation”
and “those, who are the sons of this nation, are asked to protect the legitimacy.” He then
orders the people, saying:
We must protect the constitution…on which was conducted a referendum, and
which was approved by 64% of Egyptians, and have settled on its content of
articles, and which has been settled on by the Egyptian judiciary.…And now, it is
demanded that this constitution be suspended, I absolutely refuse that, and call on
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you to protect it and to hold on to it, and to not accept any alternative to it.
(Mackell, 2013)
Here Morsi uses a fallacious logic to establish the constitutional legitimacy as universally
accepted by the majority of Egyptians, even though 30% of Egypt’s eligible voters
approved it.
Morsi again used the same topos of threat and the furthering construction of inand out-groups on June 26, 2013, when he said:
It is no secret to any rational being that there are some abroad who are overtly
hostile to this revolution. There are those who realize what a free,
strong…developed Egypt could provide to its community, both at home and
abroad…those who crave the ability to turn back the clock and revert to the state
of corruption, oppression, monopolization and injustice. It seems, unfortunately,
that there are those among us who cannot imagine being able to eat or live
without it. Egypt’s enemies have spared no effort in attempting to sabotage the
democratic experiment. They have led it into a state of violence, defamation,
incitement, and corrupt financing, as well as playing with fire in vitally important
institutions. It is known that the remnants of those who benefited from the old
regime have difficulty in seeing Egypt rise up. There is a national opposition, and
we cannot do anything but stand side by side in order for to become stronger and
have a popular presence whereby it carries out its basic roles in the alternation of
power, democratic oversight, and presenting alternatives for ruling and
development. (Atlantic Council, 2013)
In this communication, the construction of out-groups is embodied by “enemies of the
revolution” and “the democratic experiment,” enemies who “benefit from the old regime.”
The in-group then is being called upon to unify and “stand side by side,” which is the
responsible action under such threatening conditions, argued for by the topos of threat,
the topos of national responsibility, and the topos of burden. Morsi uses “playing with
fire” as a metaphorical attribution to the actions of the corrupted old regime and its
remains (the out-group) in order to heighten the severity of those actions and the dangers
of them enduring.
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As Kriesberg (2003) states, inter-group conflicts occur when each side believes
the battle is between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (p. 2), and as such, the three master-narratives
antagonistically separated themselves from each other. Yet, the positive interdependence
between the goals of some master-narratives, and between some sub-narratives, resulted
in some temporary alliances. Some examples were the short unity between the military
and the Islamists regarding their views on article II of the constitution in 2011, the united
outrage between democrats and Islamists when Ahmed Shafiq entered the presidential
elections in 2012, and the formation of the NRF against the Brotherhood. The tit-for-tat
strategy embodied by the courts disbandment of the lower house, followed by Morsi’s
exclusive power decree, and the formation of the NRF, shows that either side could
stimulate its opponent to act competitively or cooperatively depending on how they
behave when it is their turn to act. Yet, the zero-sum mentality of the nationalistic
mindset is what constituted a competitive approach for each party to reach its goals, and
in Egypt’s case that has shown to have distressing consequences.
Threats and Violence Justification
As polarization shuts down communication and takes the conflict towards
“autistic hostility” (Coleman & Deutsch, 2015, p. 42), the deepened division breeds
justified violence. In May 2013, one month before thousands advocated for Morsi’s
ousting, Al-Sisi warned, “No one should think that the solution is with the army…This
army is a fire. Do not play against it and do not play with it” (Sabry, 2013, para. 7). AlSisi uses a conceptual metaphor to describe the army as a dangerous fire in order to instill
fear in those attempting to challenge it. On a television broadcast, Al-Sisi also said,
“Whoever causes harm to the Egyptian army is causing harm to the Egyptian people”
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(Hussien, 2013), thus using the topos of definition to define harm to the army as harm to
the nation, which connects the actions to national treachery, fueled by the nationalist
mentality.
On the same accord, during Morsi’s ousting, a Muslim Brotherhood parliament
member perpetuated the situation and warned Christian communities saying, “Do not
sacrifice your children…general Muslim opinion will not be silent about the ousting of
the president” (Morgan, 2016, p. 504). This draws a completely demonized imaged of
others through a de-personalizing discursive strategy (Wodak & Boukala, 2015) that
deprives Christians from the right to life, and thus justifies violence for the sake of
nationalistic causes. Days before the ousting, Morsi himself intimidatingly said, “When
there’s violence and thuggery I must act,” (Ghattas, 2013, paras. 10). He then added in a
televised speech:
keep [protect] Egypt, keep [protect] the revolution of January 25th…keep
protecting the revolution which we have gained with our sweat and the blood of
our martyrs…don’t let the revolution be stolen from you, with any excuse, and
there are many excuses, and there are many magicians, and the challenge is
huge…if the price of defending my legitimacy as elected is my blood then I am
ready…there is no substitute for legitimacy. (Islam Elmasry, 2013).
Here Morsi uses topos of threat, the threat of losing Egypt and the revolution,
along with the metaphorical use of sweat and blood of martyrs, to instill a sense of need
for swift action to counter the danger that will ultimately waste an enormous effort. Then
he uses the topos of national responsibility, which is also in essence a religious
nationalistic mantra, dying for the sake of national protection and sovereignty from, ,
magicians (another metaphorical representation) i.e. tricksters, who only want to trick the
people of Egypt and steal their pronounced accomplishment of justice and legitimacy.
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Closer to the time of the ousting, and in response to Morsi’s comments, SCAF
released its ultimatum in June of 2013:
The Supreme Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces had mentioned
before that it’s better for us to die rather than seeing the Egyptian People being
threatened or horrified, and we swear that we would sacrifice our lives and our
blood for Egypt against every terrorist or extremist or ignorant. Long live Egypt.
(Egyptian.Armed.Forces.Admins, 2013)
Here SCAF uses a combination of topoi—the topos of definition and the topos of
threat—branding the Brotherhood as “terrorist or extremist or ignorant,” while framing
his communication within the standardized nationalist mantra, sacrifice in the name of
the nation.
On the democratic side, only a handful of democrats were in opposition of violent
intervention, while most democratic master-narrative figures justified violent intervention
using other fallacious topos. Writer Alaa al-Aswany for example commented after the
Brotherhood ousting, saying:
I cannot defend killing.…But in the end, there is a very big difference between
when you use excessive force during a war and when you use excessive force
during an ordinary, peaceful situation.…We are in a state of war.…[Morsi’s
Muslim Brothers] are not the peaceful, democratic force that they said they were
for 40 years.…They are a group of terrorists and fascists…You had Mubarak,
who was terrible. But now you have been scratched by the Ikhwan [the Arabic
name for the Brotherhood] and what do you prefer? The return of the old regime,
or staying with the Ikhwan?…We don’t want the Ikhwan, and we don’t want the
old regime. We want a democratic state. (Kingsley, 2013)
In this scenario, Aswany uses a fallacious topos of reality, which argues that
“because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made” (Wodak
& Boukala, 2015, p.97), followed by the topos of burden, to establish validity and need to
the use of excessive force against Muslim Brotherhood supporters. That is, since MB
protestors exhibited the use excessive force, the nation is therefore in a state of war, and
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because the nation is in a state of war, the military must act accordingly to moderate this
burden of war. The argument is also expanded on using the topos of threat, evident in
“war”, and the topos of definition, evident in labeling the MB “a group of terrorists and
fascists.” He then creatively relays his views on statehood by mentioning the other two
narratives, the secular narrative (the old regime) and the Islamic narrative (the Ikhwan;
The Brotherhood in Arabic), and argues that the third narrative (democratic state) is what
“we” (Egyptians, collective society) desire.
Similarly, young revolutionaries celebrated the military’s action to oust Morsi.
The Tamarod (see profiles) movement’s leader said, “This is a president threatening his
own people. We don’t consider him the president of Egypt” (“Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi
Defiant,” 2013, “Threatening His People,” para. 6). This discursive strategy attributes
illegitimate qualities to other groups and individuals as a means to demonstrate electoral
unworthiness and disrespect for an elected president. A young artist, for example, said,
Morsi has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the people, especially after yesterday’s
speech. As a leader, he is responsible for those who died…He didn’t even
acknowledge that those who died were revolutionaries. He spoke 24 hours after
the violence. This is not a president for Egyptians. (Abdellatif, 2013, paras. 11–
12)
Denying the Brotherhood of Egyptian identity worthiness, a young activist backing
Morsi’s removal said that the Brotherhood were “un-Egyptian” and “displayed dual
loyalties.” (Dunne, 2013, paras. 5). He then confirms the conflict’s underlying motive,
the Egyptian national identity debate, by saying, “Even if in the end the military
betrays…we will still be better off than if the Brotherhood had stayed in power; at least
we will preserve our national identity.” (paras. 5).
Moreover, Egyptian liberal politician ElBaradei also stated:
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Let me make one thing clear: This was not a coup. More than 20 million people
took to the streets because the situation was no longer acceptable. Without
Morsi’s removal from office, we would have been headed toward a fascist state,
or there would have been a civil war. It was a painful decision. It was outside the
legal framework, but we had no other choice. (Sultan, 2013, para. 2)
Here ElBaradei uses the salient topos of threat to create the fallacious danger, which is
based on the condition that Morsi’s continuation guarantees the emergence of a fascist
state. This argument is furthered by the employment of the Aristotelian fallacious topos
of the aftermath, based on the condition that if Morsi stays, then there would be a civil
war. He then admits it was a decision “outside the legal framework” but argues that there
was “no other choice,” and therefore it was justified (Wodak & Boukala, 2015).
Meanwhile, Brotherhood supporter author Magdi Moghera (2015) mourned the
loss of Morsi’s supporters in the Rabaa sit-ins (See major events between 2011-2014)
saying:
In Rabaa, and in the Renaissance met the elite of the people of Egypt, they met to
become truly victorious, and regain their voice that they placed at the ballot box,
and declare the word of truth in front of a rapist that thought that tanks and
cannons will frighten them and mute their tongues.…These pure people are the
ones who were shot by the coup using anti-aircraft bullets fearing Kalashnikov
bullets would not kill them.…These pure people are whom the bulldozers of the
coup would lift their shroud wrapped bodies to place them in garbage bins so they
can go out in the desert and burry it as buried waste, without regard to humanity,
nor regard for the values, nor the shaking of conscience. They have done what
they have done, they did not know that the massacre will be a curse on them in
this world before the Hereafter. (translated from Arabic7)
Moghera uses the topos of definition to define al-Sisi as a “rapist” and designates
the military operation as a “coup” that has killed “pure people,” thereby crystalizing the
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 ﻭوﻳﯾﻌﻠﻧﻭوﺍا،٬ ﻭوﻳﯾﺳﺗﺭرﺩدﻭوﺍا ﺻﻭوﺗﻬﮭﻡم ﺍاﻟﺫذﻱي ﻭوﺿﻌﻭوﻩه ﻓﻲ ﺻﻧﺎﺩدﻳﯾﻕق ﺍاﻻﻗﺗﺭرﺍاﻉع،٬ ﺍاﺟﺗﻣﻌﻭوﺍا ﻟﻳﯾﻧﺻﺭرﻭوﺍا ﺣﻘﺎ،٬ ﻭوﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﻧﻬﮭﺿﺔ ﺍاﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﺻﻔﻭوﺓة ﺃأﻫﮬﮪھﻝل ﻣﺻﺭر،٬ﻓﻲ ﺭرﺍاﺑﻌﺔ
ﻛﻠﻣﺔ ﺣﻕق ﺃأﻣﺎﻡم ﻣﻐﺗﺻﺏب ﻅظﻥن ﺃأﻥن ﺍاﻟﻣﺩدﻓﻊ ﻭوﺍاﻟﺩدﺑﺎﺑﺔ ﺳﺗﺭرﻫﮬﮪھﺑﻬﮭﻡم ﻭوﺗﺧﺭرﺱس ﺃأﻟﺳﻧﺗﻬﮭﻡم. ﻫﮬﮪھﺅؤﻻء ﺍاﻷﻁطﻬﮭﺎﺭر ﻫﮬﮪھﻡم ﻣﻥن ﺃأﻁطﻠﻕق ﻋﻠﻳﯾﻬﮭﻡم ﺍاﻻﻧﻘﻼﺏب ﺭرﺻﺎﺻﺎﺗﻪﮫ ﺍاﻟﻣﺿﺎﺩدﺓة
 ﻭوﻫﮬﮪھﻡم ﺃأﺣﻳﯾﺎء ﻫﮬﮪھﺅؤﻻء،٬ ﻛﺄﻧﻣﺎ ﺧﺷﻲ ﺃأﻻ ﺗﻘﺗﻠﻬﮭﻡم ﺭرﺻﺎﺻﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻛﻼﺷﻳﯾﻧﻛﻭوﻑف ﻫﮬﮪھﺅؤﻻء ﺍاﻷﻁطﻬﮭﺎﺭر ﻫﮬﮪھﻡم ﻣﻥن ﺃأﺷﻌﻝل ﺟﻧﻭوﺩد ﺍاﻻﻧﻘﻼﺏب ﺍاﻟﻧﺎﺭر ﻓﻲ ﺃأﺟﺳﺎﺩدﻫﮬﮪھﻡم،٬ﻟﻠﻁطﺎﺋﺭرﺍاﺕت
 ﻭوﺃأﻫﮬﮪھﺎﻟﺕت ﻋﻠﻳﯾﻬﮭﻡم ﺍاﻟﺗﺭرﺍاﺏب ﻭوﻫﮬﮪھﻡم ﺃأﺣﻳﯾﺎءﻫﮬﮪھﺅؤﻻء ﺍاﻷﻁطﻬﮭﺎﺭر ﻫﮬﮪھﻡم ﻣﻥن ﻛﺎﻧﺕت ﺟﺭرﺍاﻓﺎﺕت،٬ ﻭوﻭوﺿﻌﺗﻬﮭﻡم ﻓﻲ ﺣﻔﺭر،٬ﺍاﻷﻁطﻬﮭﺎﺭر ﻫﮬﮪھﻡم ﻣﻥن ﺟﺭرﻓﺗﻬﮭﻡم ﺍاﻟﺟﺭرﺍاﻓﺎﺕت ﻭوﻫﮬﮪھﻡم ﺟﺭرﺣﻰ
 ﺩدﻭوﻥن ﻣﺭرﺍاﻋﺎﺓة،٬ُﺕت
 ﻟﺗﻠﻘﻳﯾﻬﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺻﻧﺎﺩدﻳﯾﻕق ﺍاﻟﻘﻣﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺗﺫذﻫﮬﮪھﺏب ﺑﻬﮭﺎ ﻭوﺗﺩدﻓﻧﻬﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺻﺣﺭرﺍاء ﻛﻣﺎ ﺗُﺩدﻓﻥن ﺍاﻟﻧﻔﺎ ﻳﯾﺎ،٬ﺍاﻻﻧﻘﻼﺏب ﺗﺭرﻓﻊ ﺟﺛﺛﻬﮭﻡم ﺍاﻟﻣﻠﻔﻭوﻓﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻷﻛﻔﺎﻥن
 ﻭوﻟﻡم ﻳﯾﻌﻠﻣﻭوﺍا ﺃأﻥن ﺗﻠﻙك ﺍاﻟﻣﺫذﺑﺣﺔ ﺳﺗﻛﻭوﻥن ﻟﻌﻧﺔ ﻋﻠﻳﯾﻬﮭﻡم ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺩدﻧﻳﯾﺎ ﻗﺑﻝل ﺍاﻵﺧﺭرﺓة،٬ ﻭوﻻ ﺍاﻫﮬﮪھﺗﺯزﺍاﺯز ﻟﺿﻣﻳﯾﺭر ﻟﻘﺩد ﻓﻌﻠﻭوﺍا ﻣﺎ ﻓﻌﻠﻭوﺍا،٬ ﻭوﻻ ﺍاﻋﺗﺑﺎﺭر ﻟﻘﻳﯾﻡم،٬ 
	ﻹﻧﺳﺎﻧﻳﯾﺔ 
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image of two distinct opposing groups, a demonic and a pure group. He then attributes
through religious denominations that the actions warrant a divine “curse,” which
highlights the leading religious nationalist outlook embraced by the Brotherhood and its
supporters. Similarly, after the ousting, a militant Islamic group announced after carrying
out a successful suicide bombing operation, “God allowed us to break the security system
of the Minister of Interior…through a suicide operation committed by one of Egypt’s
lions that made the Interior butcher see death with his eyes, and what is to come will be
worse” (Saleh, 2013).
Later after the ousting, Al-Sisi said:
The economic, social, political and security realities [in Egypt]—whether before
January 25th Revolution 2011 or the accumulations afterwards until June 30th
Revolution 2013…have reached the limit that requires an honest and brave
confrontation of challenges. This is not acceptable either. [Egyptians deserve a
better life than this.] They deserve to a lead a life of dignity, security and
freedom.…[The wheel of] production has to resume in all sectors, [with all of its
power], to save our country from real dangers [it is passing through].
(Egyptsource, 2014)
Here, Al-Sisi use the topos of definition to define Morsi’s ousting as another
“revolution,” versus the Brotherhood’s perspective of it being a “coup,” by paralleling it
to the revolution of 2011 against Mubarak, hence also describing it as a revolution
against tyranny. He does so in order to normalize the ousting as one of pronounced
historical accomplishment. Additionally, due to his nationalistic predisposition, he frames
national “security” as a collective Egyptian need, and as one of the necessities to save
“our country” (in-group) from “real dangers” (out-group), in reference to Morsi’s regime.
He also added:
The State needs to regain its…prestige that was injured during this past period.
What [we have] witnessed in recent years, [whether] in politics or the media,
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internally or externally has caused the nation at times to be violated. It is time for
this disrespect and intrusion to stop. This is a dignified and respected country, and
everyone needs to know that this is a decisive moment, that disrespecting Egypt’s
right is a gamble which comes with consequences [and reckoning]. Egypt is not a
playground for any internal, regional or international party and it never will be.
The abilities and talents possessed by the Egyptian people for seven thousand
years have to ally with hard work. It is the hard, sincere, and patriotic work that
creates successful countries [advanced countries]. (Egyptsource, 2014)

Al-Sisi here aims to use the “the triadic structure of nationalist rhetoric” (Levinger &
Lytle, 2001), which is a nationalist process of mobilization that connects the glorious past
and degraded present and the hope for a utopian future. Here, the degraded present
(“recent years,” or the Brotherhood’s era) is presented in the form of injured national
pride and “disrespect” toward Egypt. The glorious past extends back to the Pharaohs’
dynasties (“abilities and talents possessed by the Egyptian people for seven thousand
years”). Al-Sisi goes on, using topos of threat, to remind the people why he must run for
president and describes the utopian future saying:
We are threatened by terrorists…by parties who seek the destruction of our life,
safety and security. It is true this is my last day in uniform but I will fight every
day for [an] Egypt free of fear and terror.…I repeat what I have said before:
“We’d rather die before Egyptians are terrorized.” Allow me to speak about
hope…hope that is the outcome of hard work…hope that is the security and
stability. Hope is the dream to usher Egypt to its leading place in the world. It is
the dream to restore its strength, power and influence and teach the world as it did
before. I cannot make miracles. Rather, I propose hard work, and self-denial with
no limits. If I am granted the honor of the leadership, I promise that we together,
leadership and people, can achieve stability, safety and hope for Egypt…God
bless Egypt and its glorious people. Thank you. (Egyptsource, 2014)
Later, after he won the presidency in 2014, he continued to normalize the ousting
within the Egyptian historical narrative saying that Egyptians made history in the past
two years by revolting against corruption and despotism to claim their right to freedom,
dignity, and social justice. He applauded the Egyptian people for refusing to yield to the
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tyranny of a faction that in the name of religion had put its narrow interests before those
of the people and strove to undermine the democratic process (“Egypt,” n.d.).
As demonstrated, the analysis demonstrates how fossilized creations of in-groups
and out-groups formed demonized enemy images on all sides of the three masternarratives to a point where truth of who is to blame became vague and frivolous. Each
group equally claimed the liability on the other groups for placing Egypt on the path of
ruin. This demonization licensed an atmosphere in which mass killings became justified,
adding a complex layer to a conflict originally about drafting a constitution. Ashraf
Khalil captures this toxic atmosphere during the 2013 ousting saying:
The animosity against the Brotherhood is so intense that there really does seem to
be a desire to just wipe them off the political playing field. And I’ve had
conversations with people where their solution is, in Arabic translates to, “Just
round them all up.”…How do we function as a country when we’ve rounded up
15 percent of the dissidents? (Childress, 2013, paras. 32).
The violent exchanges deepened mistrust, as agony became the primary reference
for facts (Anastasiou, 2007). As the conflict progressed particularly towards the Rabaa
incident, and until present day, the sole experience the three competing narratives have of
each other became the sum of hostile incidences. The deep meaning that this violence
communicates replaces all messages by false assumptions (Anastasiou, 2007). Thus, AlSisi became one side’s champion and the other side’s scoundrel, and so did Morsi.
Today, each master-narrative has but to mourn for the trials experienced by their ingroup.
Discussion
The analysis shows that the duration of the constitutional battle was a context in
which the legitimacy of all political leadership, beginning with Mubarak and ending with
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Morsi, became vulnerable. Within this context, it is common for political leaders to
employ national identity as a plea to inaugurate homogony, which explains the attempts
of polarization and the creation of in-groups and out-groups amid the three masternarratives (Maiese & Norlen, 2003). Yet, the analysis reveals that Egypt’s national
identity dilemma extends beyond a mere plea against chaos, reflected by the nationalistic
arguments underscoring the constitutional battle. The varied aspirations represent the tip
of a thread that leads to deeper reasons as to why there are multiple narratives in Egypt to
begin with. This sheds light on correlations between a resolution for the issue of defining
an Egyptian national identity and a resolution for the disagreements on constitutional
matters. However, my second claim argues that the complexity of defining an accurate
Egyptian national identity, due to its equivocal nature—produced by the long-gone
narrative—makes it an unsound topic for absolute resolve.
As the historical narrative reveals, since the Pharaohs, Egypt has been ruled by
outsiders up until the 1952 military revolt; thus, from a modern-day Egyptian viewpoint,
Nasser’s rule returned Egypt to its lawful proprietors. Still, in reality the bygone narrative
has had its traumatic impact on collective identity loss, making it illogical to think that
modern-day Egyptians are anything but a melting pot of genealogically and ideologically
assorted and bewildered identity clusters (Bassett, 1994). This identity-loss progression
charted a vacant space with prime conditions that offered a need for unifying novel
identities—in particular, ones that called for a separation from conquerors—a truly
distinctive Egyptian character; a counter nationalism as mentioned in the literate review
of this thesis.
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Ironically, Egyptians’ encounters with Greek, Roman, Arab, Napoleonic, and
British models of sociological and militaristic governing systems were the points of
reference for redesigning these counter nationalisms. Wynn (2007) builds on how
national identities are constructed through mimicking others as a result of intercultural
mixing saying:
The comparison of Arab and Western experiences in Egypt reveals how national
identities are created partly through encounters with cultural others. This research
links up the cross-cultural projects of tourism, archaeology, and cultural
performance as components in the production of multiple, contested, and often
competing imaginations of nation and people. (p. 21)
Even though Wynn’s work focuses on modern-day encounters through tourism, if the
concepts are applicable for these short-term interactions, then they are easily transferable
to long-term encounters that took place during the empire-building eras. This confirms
the idea that through Egypt’s encounters with others, modern Egyptian national identities
were defined. The process by which these distinctive identities were forged is crucial to
the understanding of important intractability facets to the conflict, namely its continuity
and the equivocal nature of single Egyptian national identity.
The idea of the nation-state presented a new trend of unifying identities; an
awareness of national identity grew in Egypt during the late 19th century and early 20th
century. To trace the evolution of this Egyptian national awareness, I referred to
anthropologist Winifred Blackman’s (2000) The Fellahin of Upper Egypt, a book that
studied Egyptian farmers and was first published in 1968. I chose Blackman’s book
because his findings hypothesize that the fellahin (farmers) exhibited ancient Egyptian
traits, shedding light on their existence during Pharaoh Egypt, and hence they represented
one of the most popular theories for “original” Egyptian. Yet, as seen today, the fellahin
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have also amalgamated into some aspects of the civilizations that followed the Pharaohs,
through religion, culture, and education. The religion aspect is evident in seeing Christian
fellahin and Muslim fellahin, while the culture aspect is apparent by acquired dress codes,
culinary recipes, and more. The fez or tarboush, for example, was adopted during
Ottoman Egypt and was worn by leading figures of all three master-narratives whom are
all of fellahin origins.
The influence of education on the other hand, traces back to the time of
Muhammad Ali’s Egypt, when some fellahin offspring had to choose between advanced
schooling and joining the military. If they became literate, they had a chance at earning
the title of effendi (a title of nobility used in the Ottoman Empire equal to the English sir)
or becoming religious scholars. This process of migrating and educating the fellahin from
rural to urban created their attentiveness to the idea of them being legatees of Egypt
(Sayyid-Marsot, 1977). Muhammad Husayn Haykal’s 1913 novel titled Zaynab
(Brugman, 1984) describes the lives of fellahin and scorns urban intellectuals for stalling
against British occupation. Haykal wrote, “British remain in the country and the khedive
remains in power…only through unity can the literate classes effect change, just as the
peasants cannot overcome tyranny until they stand up together” (Gasper, 2009, pp. 213–
214). Brugman (1984) says that Zaynab was first published under the name “Misri
Fallah,” meaning “Egyptian of peasant origins,” hinting to an “autochthonous Egyptian.”
This shows how aware Haykal was of the idea that he was an Egyptian not belonging to
the Turco-Circassian rulers.
This new national awareness was funded by Britain’s assimilation for many Arab
and Egyptian intelligentsias, which resulted in them housing the values of the French
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Revolution to the degrading conditions of the Muslim world. In this group was Jamal alDin al-Afghani, his student Muhammad Abduh, and Abduh’s student Rashid Rida (Ginat,
1997, p. 101), who together raised questions about Islam’s role in the modern world and
provided central answers to the evolution of Egyptian nationalist thought (Cook, 2011).
Prominent followers who strove to further these thoughts were Mustafa Kamil, Ahmad
Lutfi al-Sayyid, Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul, and Saad Zaghlul (Ginat, 1997, p. 101). Lutfi alSayyid’s writings (Ahmed, 1960, p. 95) and Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul’s translations of
Anglo-Saxon education stirred collective criticism against Egypt’s rulers and charged
independence (Ahmed, 1960, p. 46).
However, disagreements about Islam’s role in this modern transformation
initiated major divides among these rising political leaders. Richard Bulliet’s (2002) The
Crisis within Islam traces the roots of this dilemma of interpreting Islam in modernity
back to when some rising Islamic nationalist embraced reforms based on European
models that replaced Islamic Sharia law. This was because Abduh’s disciples showed
significant differences in interpreting his thoughts; Al-Sayyid, for example, was not as
committed to the centrality of Islam as Abduh was. He objected to the British and
Ottomans because they ruled absolutely, but decided that Islam and nationalism were
incompatible, and thus, turned to liberalism (Cook, 2011, p. 17). On the contrary, Islamic
scholars such as Hassan al-Banna viewed national identity as the modern vessel for
Islamic religious identities, while rising militarized fellahin attuned themselves to secular
nationalism. Consequentially, each of the three groups synthesized a modern national
identity narrative utilizing their religious, cultural, and educational pathways, which are
essentially projections onto qualities of specific eras of the Egyptian historical narrative.
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These three groups whom represent three pathways of constructing modern Egyptian
national identities highlight how the 2011 conflict actors are merely spawned apprentices
of Egypt’s early 20th-century intellectual blooming.
To exemplify, the democratic master-narrative nested mainly in Pharaonic
nationalism, or Pharaonism (Reid, 2015), which suggests an Egyptian national identity
dating back to the Pharaohs, separating “Egyptian-ness” from the rest of the Islamic
world. Later cohorts such as Saad Zaghlul, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, and Taha Hussein (all
of fellahin origin) anchored Europeanism to the modern Egyptian self-image (Wynn,
2007). Taha Hussein, for instance, debated that Egyptian national identity cannot be
premised solely on religious or linguistic grounds, because “the Egyptian mind has
retained a distinctive character based in part on the legacy of ancient Egypt and in part on
the inspirational impetus derived from Egypt’s historical and organic rootedness in a
Graeco-Roman world” (Suleiman, 1996, pp. 31–33). Furthermore, Hussein argued that
non-Muslim Egyptians would be sidelined if Islam was the source of Egyptian national
identity (Suleiman, 1996), paralleling the arguments made by liberals/leftists and young
revolutionaries during the 2012 constitutional battle.
The democratic narrative was charged in 1906 after a quarrel amid Egyptian
farmers and British soldiers resulted in the hanging of four farmers. The episode, known
as the Dinshaway Incident, triggered the finding of the first liberal political party in
Egypt, the Umma (the Nation) Party by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. Egypt’s partial
independence from Britain in 1920 and the discovery of Tutankhamen’s tomb by Howard
Carter in 1922 strengthened the Pharaonic element of Egyptian nationalism, and paved
the way for Saad Zaghlul’s rise as a political leader in 1924 (Wynn, 2007). Zaghlul was
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born in a rural village in the fellahin of Egypt and while attended Al-Azhar University he
was amongst those fellahin that also studied at a French law school in Cairo and traveled
to Europe. Yet his achievements were due to his affiliation with Egyptian rural idioms, as
he reaped such immense admiration among the Egyptian people that he was branded
“Father of the Egyptians” (Cleveland, 2004). His worldview was largely liberal rather
than religious, and organized mass movements demanding an end to the British colony.
When the British exiled him to Malta, the Egyptian people staged rallies, marking their
first 20th-century revolution. Upon his demanded return, Zaghlul led a new movement
through the liberal Wafd Party, drafted a new constitution in 1923 based on a
parliamentary representative system, and became the first elected prime minister of Egypt.
As architectural proof to the growing metaphoric significance of the Pharaonic
past for Egyptian nationalists, upon his death, Zaghlul was buried in a neo-Pharaonic
tomb that takes up a city block in one of Cairo’s districts (Wynn, 2007). Under the
parliamentary monarchy, Egypt cultivated a set of intellectuals who facilitated the
democratic tone through a commitment to individual freedoms, secularism, and faith in
science. This period became viewed with liking by future generations as the Golden Age
of Egyptian liberalism that prioritized the state’s interests (Jankowski, 1970). Egyptian
liberals today are all but individuals advancing ideas pushed forward by Zaghlul and his
counterparts. Hamzawy’s ideas for example are prime illustrations of this ideological
inheritance, which is evident in his advocacy for a comparable replica of the
parliamentary system accomplished by the Wafd Party in 1923.
The secular narrative on the other end was instigated during Muhammad Ali’s
Egypt, when military drafting shifted to the fellahin, who viewed it as an opportunity for
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vertical mobility if they were unable to pursue the scholarly route. For Ali, the
recruitment was an ethnic cleansing of his borders after his seizure of Egypt, since an
indigenous army was needed to replace the traditional Ottoman mercenary. Thus,
dedicated technical facilities were set up with rigorous training systems to instill a sense
of reverence for rule of law into the fellahin, who served for three years but were branded
soldiers for life. The fellahin were not fond of military life and its terms, yet the process
transformed them into methodical soldiers (Fahmy, 1997; Sayyid-Marsot, 1984). In the
years to follow, the oppressive measures burdening the soldiers, the utmost discontent
with Ali’s successors and their lavish living, and the perturbed parliamentary rule
undermined the faith in the king and the liberal experiment, planting the military’s
political interpolation.
Gordon (1992) quote’s the soldiers’ critical impression of the king’s life, saying:
He [the king] sleeps on ostrich feathers, immersed in silk. If the Egyptian people
could visit the Sirag al-Din palace they would immediately realize what an
enormous lie proclaims Sirag al-Din leader of the people. The man who lives in
the likes of this palace can be nothing other than the enemy of the people. Gold on
the walls, gold on the staircases, gold in the ceiling, gold on the tables and desks,
gold, gold everywhere. (p.28)
Gamal Abdel Nasser (the second president of Egypt) reflects in an interview with
the Sunday Times about his youth before becoming an officer saying, “I entered jail as an
enthusiastic student and left fraught with rage. A long time passed before my ideas,
beliefs and plans took shape but even at that early stage, I knew my country was
embroiled in a continuous struggle for freedom.” (Morgan, 1962, paras.6). Nasser was
interested in Arab literature by Tawfiq Al-Hakim, such as Return of the Spirit, about the
emergence of an Egyptian leader who will unite Egyptians and fight for the revival of
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their national spirit (Osman, 2011; Reid, 2015). As a result, an underground movement
termed the “free officers” was triggered (Cook, 2011, p. 44; Gordon, 1992) and launched
a successful revolt in 1952 demanding that the king and the British leave Egypt. Nasser,
through Nasserism, favored a Pan-Arab identity that allowed him to challenge Iranian
and Saudi attempts at regional leadership on the basis of a Pan-Islamic identity (Wynn,
2007).
Yet Pharaonic nationalism would come to accompany Pan-Arabism under
president Anwar Sadat, who often referred to Egypt’s ancient Pharaonic heritage in his
speeches, calling himself “the last of the pharaohs” (Wynn, 2007, p. 166). By the time of
his death, a biographer of Sadat wrote, “For the first time the people of Egypt had killed
their Pharaoh” (Wynn, 2007, p. 166), while Sadat’s assassins gleefully shouted, “We
have killed Pharaoh!” (Wynn, 2007, p. 166), illustrating the ambivalence with which
some Egyptians regard their Pharaonic past (Wynn, 2007). During the Mubarak era,
Mubarak’s nonmilitary son and his elite business friends weakened his position as a
military representative. His catchall approach diluted Pan-Arabism, and as Salem (2013)
highlights, the introduction of neoliberalism hindered the military’s status and national
agendas. Salem (2013) argues that this explains the military’s strategic decision to side
with the protestors during the 2011 revolution and its return to power in 2014. Morsi’s
2013 ousting and Al-Sisi’s return to the power seat in 2014 are without a doubt a
simulated victory to the 1952 revolt.
For the Islamist narrative, its Pan-Islamism ideology sprung and gained its
terminology from a newspaper that affirmed a union among Muslims superior to national
identities: Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa newspaper (Ahmed, 1960). In this religious awakening,
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while some Al-Azhar students remained servants of the evolving state (Sufis),
independent students who were displeased with the university’s passive stance against
Egypt’s emancipation, branched into other forms of Pan-Islamist movements. The
Salafist movement became one that was mostly concerned with restrictions on practice
and shied away from political involvement. On another end, the more politically active
Hassan al-Banna launched his education at a rural religious school, where he enriched his
theological training (Mitchell, 1960). His religious activism is reflected in Mitchell’s
(1960) tale in which Al-Banna attempts to have an invasive statue of a “semi-naked”
woman confiscated by authorities (p. 16). He joined several religious groups, such as
“The Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden,” for naming moral offenses of those
regarded as living in defilement of Islam (Mitchell, 1960, pp. 12–13).
Al-Banna perceived the social liberation of Egypt and British presence as attacks
on Islamic orthodoxy weakening the influence of religion (Mitchell, 1960). He wept in
response, saying, “No one but God knows how many nights we spent reviewing the state
of the nation, analyzing the sickness of the thinking and the possible remedies, so
disturbed were we that we reached the point of tears” (Mitchell, 1960, p. 17). In 1928, the
Muslim Brotherhood idea sprung with a foundation that is reflected in the group’s
renowned slogan “Islam is the solution”—a belief that a return to Islamic Egypt would
eradicate the injustices bestowed by colonization. Al-Banna preached:
Islam requires that the Muslim community unite around one leader or one head,
the head of the Islamic State, and it forbids the Muslim community from being
divided among states…The Muslim Brotherhood puts the idea of the caliphate
and work to restore it at the forefront of its plans. (Mitchell, 1960, p. 17)
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The organization grew from 800 members in 1936 to 200,000 by 1938, and over 2
million by 1948, but was banned after being accused of homicides against the British.
Nevertheless, they continued subversive activity through the 1950s and aided the 1952
coup d’état by the Free Officers in the hopes of Islamizing Egypt. After the coup, Nasser
imprisoned thousands of Brotherhood members, blaming them for an attempt on his life
(Bannā, 1978; Mitchell, 1993).
In 2001, a document dated 1982 outlined a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy
for the Brotherhood and inspired the writing of a book titled La conquête de l’Occident:
Le projet secret des Islamistes (The Conquest of the West: The Islamists’ Secret Project)
by Sylvain Besson (“The Muslim Brotherhood ‘Project,’” 2016). In those years, the
Brotherhood combated what it called the current US-led war against Islamic identity,
forcing the Ministry of Culture to ban the publication of three novels, arguing they
endorsed blasphemy (Bradley, 2008). This history explains the group’s 2005 political
platform and explains the Islamists’ hurdle to dominate the writing of the constitution in
2012.
These three conflicting examples of counter national ideologies acted as
mechanisms that serve the modern-day conviction of self-realization within the Egyptian
nation-state. This self-realization is based on the continuance of past identities that
manifest themselves through opinions on modern-day norms and rules that develop
national unity; the battle surrounding Article II in 2011 is a prime example of that.
Moreover, these views as shown where not unique to the 2011 political scene; each
narrative in 2011 was predisposed with its own views on statehood and its own views of
the other.
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During a speech in 2014, Al-Sisi acknowledged one side of this notion of a long-

standing struggle, saying, “Egypt had suffered from the scourge of terrorism since the
1920s” (“His Excellency Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, President,” n.d.), referring to the emergent
years of the Muslim Brotherhood. During those times, Lutfi al-Sayyid also wrote:
The idea of an Islamic unity might occur to some who are not seriously engaged
in politics…Pan-Islamism has long been with us as a conception which comes
out…whenever Egyptians see European statement acting in concert against
Egyptian interests…they tend to contract their fortune with that of the Balkan
domains of the Ottoman Empire. They conclude that these dependencies have
won their independence…because their inhabitant are Christians…that there is a
certain type of unity among the Christians in Europe…consequently they wish for
a unity among Muslims.…As Christians unity saved the Balkan countries from
yoke of the Muslim Ottomans, Muslim unity would save Egyptians from
European Hegemony. This, we believe, is a naïve idea engendered by a faulty
understanding of European politics in the East. (Ahmed, 1960, p. 61)
During 1952, the prime ministry cabinet included an associate of the Muslim
Brotherhood who Cook (2011) says was “a far more controversial selection that would
have repercussions for Brotherhood–Free Officer relations down the road” (p. 46).
Mitchell (1960) describes that his dissertation research during Nasser’s time was
“sporadically curtailed, often enriched and always complicated by the growing pains of a
revolutionary government, increasing tensions between this military government and the
Muslim Brothers” (p. xxvi). He defines the tension as “a cleavage with in the society”
(p.2), with the two groups struggling to hold power. Nasser also clashed with liberal
leader Mustafa al-Nahhas, when he wanted to retire old parliamentary front-runners in
favor of a new cohort of politicians (Mitchell, 1960, pp. 48–49).
After Nasser, the Brotherhood clashed and assassinated Sadat after he signed the
peace treaty with Israel (Ibrahim, 1982). During Mubarak’s Egypt, in an article titled “In
Egypt the Real Struggle Is Between Mubarak and the Brotherhood,” a Brotherhood
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member said, “No one knows for sure how many political prisoners the Mubarak
government holds behind bars…maybe 50,000” (Halsell, 1996, para. 1). In Mubarak’s
1995 Brotherhood crackdown, police charged some with “directing an illegal
organization aiming to impede the rule of law and the constitution” (Halsell, 1996, para.
5). Virginia Sherry, director of Middle East affairs for the New York–based Human
Rights Watch, said, “It’s not related to political violence. It appears to be an assault on
political opposition across a broad spectrum” (Halsell, 1996, para. 5). Another
Brotherhood member said, “Mubarak’s government is pressing people toward
desperation, terrorism will be the only way for change” (Halsell, 1996, para. 6). A 74year-old Brotherhood spokesperson imprisoned for 7 years said, “My crime was simply
the way I thought…Here in Egypt…we all meet in the prisons” (Halsell, 1996, paras. 11,
20).
In concluding the analysis and the discussion, the 2011 conflict ought to be
viewed as a snippet of a long-standing rivalry amid the three master-narratives—an
enduring conflict around governing matters that are in essence allegorical components of
conflicting fabricated sole identities for Egypt. These absolute nationalistic attempts
create an entwining never-ending conflict because of the ambiguity surrounding the
consistency of Egyptian identity through decades of external influences. These attempts
are fueled by the nationalistic myth that puts forward the notion of a continuing historical
narrative of the nation as descendants and heirs to the homeland of their ancestors, whom
they share a common fate and an unceasing legacy.
This reckons the verdict of an absolute resolution for the definition of modern
Egyptian national identity an unconceivable and nebulous expedition, and an illogical
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route to pursue in resolving this modern day dilemma. With that, today’s fabricated
absolute modern day Egyptian identities ought to reflect on the fact that they have more
in common amongst themselves than they do with whom they claim ancestry; they ought
to reflect on finding the crosscutting Egypt within the divided one. These ideas raise
fundamental question about an alternative method for resolution, particularly after the
convolution brought on by the additional layers of violent exchanges and the ensued
grievances.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommendations

The protracted reenactment of a consistent struggle has wedged Egyptians in
looping waves of debate due to the absence of prospects to engage in dialogical ventures
that may foster an understanding of the nature of modern Egyptian national identity.
Demonstrated by the analysis, even when dialogue was presented, it was arrogantly
refused by both the constitution opposing parties in 2012 and the Brotherhood’s
presidency in 2013. This arrogance is also verified in the tit-for-tat competitive nature
amid the three master-narratives, in how the actions of one group became a consequence
of another group’s preceding actions. This sheds light on a pattern of historical escalation
that has resulted in a heap of complex grievances that continued to rise with every
conflict wave. This arrogant behavior is a crosscutting notion embedded in the conflict
styles of the three master-narratives, and comes as no surprise given the nation’s
traumatizing history of conqueror subjectivity.
As mentioned in the literature review of this thesis, in defining arrogance, I
explained how individuals displaying it are usually attempting to veil feelings of
inferiority. In Egypt’s case, decades of conquest have created traumatizing feelings of
inadequacy, due to the superiority of the colonizer over the colonized. Alongside the
corruption and oppression of postcolonial dictatorships (a reincarnation of imperialism
itself), this suppression gave rise to the arrogant behavior that infuses Egyptian conflict
styles. These behaviors foster a rigid mind and block people’s “receptors of change” and
new thinking, because they transform all dialogical attempts into futile debates that
subsequently lead to violence and utter mistrust (Bassett, 1994; Fisher & Sharp, 2004).
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However, in recommending processes of conflict resolution for the outcomes of
this thesis, on one end I looked into research Oliver Ramsbotham’s work, which seeks to
understand why conflict resolution methods are sometimes ineffective in resolving such
intractable conflicts. He suggests that one of the main reasons for this failure is due to
people engaging in what he calls “radical disagreements.” Ramsbotham defines radical
disagreement in many ways, such as “conflicting perceptions” and “embattled beliefs”,
and explains that they are disagreements in which people do not see conflicting opinions
as two varying perception of truth. Instead, he says, they attempt to present their
worldview as the sole true perspective. He argues that acknowledging both the existence
of a radical disagreement about truth and the distance resulted between the conflicting
parties is key to dealing with the problem (Ferguson, 2012).
Ramsbotham hence sets out to promote what he calls a “dialogue of strategic
engagement,” which is a part of the natural conflict dynamic, argumentative and intense,
instead of a dialogue for mutual understanding. He argues that when conflicts are highly
intractable conflict actors are not ready to explore common ground, but in place of
silence, argumentative dialogues may allow all sides to gain a better insight into the depth
of the disagreement. They also offer the opportunity for thoughts to be uttered by one
side that grasps the attention of the other side, which may cause an opening to additional
constructive communication (Ferguson, 2012). This relates to other works by
Ramsbotham regarding the theory of “contact” between divided communities. He
explains that in the course of a radical disagreement not everyone within the same
narrative is a hardliner, and sheds light that there is some who can be considered
moderates within their narratives. Hence, any type of contact can act as a passageway to
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identify such individuals that later can be recruited for a more productive dialogue around
areas of common interest (R. Cunliffe, personal communication, 2015). This work
suggests that there could be some form of argumentative dialogue that could work as a
starting point of recruitment for a long-term resolution process.
On another end, in order to further understand the role of arrogance, I referred to
Tracy and Prehn’s (2011) analysis of “pride in context”, which explains two facets of
pride that “through expression, experience, and motivational impact on behavior function
to promote a distinct behavioral repertoire for attaining status” (p. 1). The authors argue
for a distinction between status earned through socially valued skills (self-confidence)
and status forcibly taken by intimidation and dominance (arrogance) (Tracy & Prehn,
2011). Arrogance therefore can be viewed as a state of low self-confidence, or selfdistrust.
Two Levels of Distrust
With the above premises in place, it can be concluded that there are two levels of
trust building needed as part of the resolution process and for positive dialogue to take
place, trusting others and self-trust. It also indicates that the resolution process may need
to be a multi-stage and a multi-level process. Argumentative dialogue as the initial stage,
while acting as a tool for recruitment for positive dialogue, may also create an
opportunity for trust. This initial stage maybe risky and perhaps unsuitable, but it may
create an opportunity for trust building for the following stage. The following stages
should focus on building both trust and self-confidence.
In relation to positive dialogue in particular, self-confidence promotes respect for
protocols, invites the opinion of experts, and is more likely to help individuals realize
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their interdependence as members of society. Confidence assures the individual that the
utilization of experts, respect for regulations, and listening to conflicting views does not
lessen one’s own abilities, and often heightens rational thinking. Self-confidence also has
bearing on the willingness to reconcile, which is essential, as true reconciliation occurs
when parties wield determination to rebuild the damaged relationship. Thus, by replacing
arrogance with confidence, we are also taking the initial step in building further trust
amid the three master-narratives, and hence positive dialectical approaches have a higher
chance of being effective (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Lewicki & Tomlinson,
2003; Rousseau et al., 1998).
Conflict Resolution Training
Bearing in mind Feller and Ryan’s (2012) eight core traits in the makeup of
effective dialogical approaches, the process of designing a positive dialogue can begin at
the pre-dialogue stage by injecting a culture of conflict resolution into Egyptian society
on the top, middle, and grassroots levels, as also described in Lederach’s (1997) Building
Peace. This is particularly what I meant by a multi-layered resolution process, in which
interveners creatively construct an incentive to aid in the emergence, attraction, and
support of the correct minds for involvement simultaneously as the argumentative
dialogues are taking place. While collective approval is not the objective at this stage, the
purpose is the reeducation at key levels of society through voluntary training seminars for
ideologically assorted hardliner accomplices, key government representatives, business
and societal figures, and youth organizations. These conferences should to teach
encounter skills with which to analyze conflict, recognizing and articulating emotions,
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highlighting the colossal benefits of heighten living circumstances in conflict-free zones,
and the benefits of dialectic forms (Abu-Nimer, 1999).
Building Self-Confidence and Trust
On another layer, the outcomes from these conflict resolution training conferences
and argumentative dialogues can be used to enroll a pool of ideologically diverse
individuals in peace-building cooperative projects that focus on building self-confidence
and coexistence. These types of projects are suitable for top, middle, and grassroots levels,
and may aid in the emergence of primed individuals for positive dialogue recruitment on
all three master-narrative levels. If designed correctly, individuals can build selfconfidence through overcoming certain challenges and accomplishing targeted goals,
while also building trust of each other by confronting indifferent parties and working as
teams. The projects however must encompass two major elements. One, they must be
short-term in order to cater to the instant-gratification nature of the Egyptian community
and in order to reduce risks. Two, they must target simple communal goals, in order to
minimize the risk of failure, since an unsuccessful project would accomplish the exact
opposite of its intentions.
Below I propose some ideas with the understanding that they need careful review
and design; works-in-progress that can be developed to accomplish the above trustbuilding goals. One project for example is to create a national high-quality product made
out of 100% Egyptian materials, from farm to retail, which may instill a sense of national
confidence, especially if it earned the respect of the international community. Another
project is to establish a mentorship program at the elementary and university levels that
targets building self-trust and self-confidence connecting students’ education with real
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life prospects. More project ideas could center on educational workshops designed to reeducate the public about Egyptian history in such a way that highlight how Egypt evokes
home for all three master-narratives. Other projects ideas may include: a coastal rescue
project; garbage-cleaning project; a community farms and gardens project. These selfconfidence and trust-building projects are the first step in further targeting and educating
the moderates within each master-narrative, and thus increasing the chance of recruiting
flexible mindsets and newfangled faces who can deconstruct the assumptions engraved
by status quo agents.
Designing Positive Dialogue
When positive dialogue is then suggested, selecting a safe space for the talks to
take place is also a key element. Incorporating the movement trait advised by Feller and
Ryan (2012), a place such as Cyprus can be best fitted for its neutrality regarding the
conflict, its proximity to Egypt, its own history of successfully utilizing dialectic
structures, and its multiethnic and multi-religious composition that can be seen as a
comparison to Egypt’s own struggle. In addition, resemblances between Cypriot and
Egyptian culture and weather can generate a consoling environment for Egyptians to
speak their minds. Another key component is a mediator that clasps religious and
political knowledge, one who can use terminology that appeals to all sides equally. An
Egyptian native, familiar with Egyptian national jargon and colloquial dialects, with a
scholarly accredited education in peace and conflict resolution, along with a deep
understanding of political, economic, and Islamic Sharia law, may be a seamless
candidate.

COMPETING	
  NARRATIVES	
  	
  

96
Facilitators that lack Egyptian nationality and Islamic background may be viewed

as an infringement on Egyptian national affairs, and would fall short of the advantage of
technically arguing political issues while simultaneously drawing from spiritual law to
find alternatives to rigid interpretations of Quranic literature. This brings about the final
element of my suggested dialogue structure, which is the topics of discussion. The topics
of discussion ought to be centered on the overall benefit and initially shy away from
controversial topics such as the constitution, Israeli-Egyptian relations, and Egyptian
identity. With a focus on issues that involve Egypt’s economic, environmental, and social
health that are in essence “superordinate goals”, older notions of enemy images may
begin to shatter and fade. When older concepts begin to disappear, conversations may
then slowly shift to topics directly related to the period between 2011 and 2014.
A Final Note
In closing, futuristic paths cannot be free of realizing spaces for coexistence;
Egyptians must face the question of how multi-ideological nations can cohabitate and
thrive, an inescapable truth. Today, the conflict has imposed higher limitations on all
sides than in the past; the Egyptian community ought to learn from the burdening
outcomes of hard power and from how rigidity taxes its own groups’ interests. These
notions should be substituted with awareness that national identity is boundless, fluid in
nature, and ever changing, because it is constantly being assembled from a repertoire of
constituents (Hammoudi, 2002). In view of that, when contemplating Egyptian national
identity, the inquiry should not to be whether Egyptians consider themselves Arabs,
Muslims, Christians, democrats, or conservatives, it should be a triumphant embracement
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of Egypt’s diverse construct and their crosscutting links in a manner as momentous in
uniqueness as are its great pyramids.
I was reminded of these two sentiments as I was researching for this thesis, when
I came across Lisa Wynn’s (2007) Pyramids and Nightclubs, an examination of how
cross-cultural encounters elucidate the contradictory definitions of Egypt. The book
triggered me to reflect on my time spent living in the United States, on how conversations
about Egypt brought to mind golden deserts and monumental pyramids for those
interested in its history and ongoing clashes and bewildering chaos for those following
current events. Yet, ancient civilization and a modern-day conflict that has gained
worldwide traction were conversational starters naturally occurring for a foreigner to
Egypt. The book reminded me that, for a native like myself, Egypt evokes home, my
place of childhood joy and comfort; the place where I woke up for a late breakfast of ful
medames (fava beans) before bathing in the turquoise waters of Alexandrian seashores. I
had forgotten how stratums of Egyptian society gather at sundown at the Cornish, when
the surface of the ocean and the Nile glimmer with the reflections of elegant hotels and
international boutiques alongside the modest neon shop signs and local food carts. In that
Egypt, you ride the night after an evening stroll—some go to eateries, some go to
nightclubs, and some go to mosques. You mingle with friends and family and then head
home close to sunrise, getting a glimpse of the pyramids on the horizon, a romantic
backdrop to the country’s modern-day makeover Wynn says (Wynn, 2007).
In the initial stages of my research, this collocation of ancient against modernity
intrigued me in the sense of how Egypt has succeeded in holding on to its association
with past epochs within the molding of contemporary nation-states. However, it was not
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the furtherance of technological, medicinal, or militaristic achievements of past epochs
that intrigued me—after all, Egypt is a third-world country—but more the primordial
symbolic essence of prominence. I was aware that modern Egypt produced some political,
scientific, and artistic greatness, with Mohamed ElBaradei, the Egyptian diplomat;
Naguib Mahfouz, an Egyptian writer; and Ahmed Zewail, an Egyptian scientist, receiving
the Nobel Prize in honor of their work. Yet, thus far, in comparison with Pharaoh Egypt, I
knew that today’s Egypt suffers from a social gulf fashioned by a deterioration in the
quality of citizen life, large economic disparities, and contesting ideologies about its
defining elements, ideas at the core of my inquiry.
Nevertheless, Wynn’s reflection made me realize that most Egyptians would
approve that the Egypt I recall above is a crosscutting notion cherished by the hearts of
those from all layers of its society today. “Fava bean Egypt” has no socioeconomic or
ideological boundaries; whether at one of Egypt’s finest hotels or in Egypt’s “random
building” communities, alashwaeyat, you are guaranteed the same tasty helping of
Egyptian fava beans. The customary breakfast has become something of a national dish.
Ful medames is believed to be, according to the saying “Beans have satisfied even the
Pharaohs” (Roden, 2000, p. 328), the food of the Pharaohs. Researcher Layla Eplett even
wrote that Pharaoh Ramses III presented thousands of fava beans in jars to the Nile god,
and Egyptians excitedly tell how the beans have been found imprinted on Pharaonic
tombs (Chambers, 2014). Ironically, I also realized that fava bean brunches in and of
themselves are among the many self-constructed notions of the modern Egyptian nation.
Still, all layers of society eat them notwithstanding the truthfulness of their ancestrypassing claim.
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Thus, even from a metaphorical stance, one realizes that there is in fact a
traversing Egypt within the divided one. Both the rich and the poor, the secular and the
religious, will delightedly converse about their favored fava recipe. Perhaps this is
because Fava beans as a topic and shared communal aspect remains debate-free, and as
such, symbolizes hope for Egyptians’ willingness to share communal aspects of Egypt’s
modern day defining elements.
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